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ABSTRACT 
BAKER, RACHEL Time to cry over spilled milk: An investigation into China’s food 
safety system. Asian Studies Department, March 2012. 
 
Advisor: Mark Dallas 
China is plagued with food safety scandals ranging from contamination of dairy, 
to exploding watermelons in the countryside. This thesis explores the four main reasons 
that China has many food safety regulatory issues: the wide dispersion of farms in China, 
the fragmentation of the food safety regulatory system, weakness of local 
implementation, and the poor structure of commerce. Using the case studies of the dairy 
and pork industries this thesis examines these four proposed flaws and proposed solutions 
for improving food safety in China. Governmental flaws and mistakes are mostly 
responsible for these problems, but the current structure of government is too 
bureaucratic and corrupt to properly handle the problem. Therefore, improvement of food 
safety relies on private enterprises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 2008, a bizarre illness was spreading across China; infants across the country 
were found to have kidney stones. Parents and doctors alike were baffled at what could 
be causing these kidney stones, which led to life-threatening illnesses in 300,000 
individuals, mostly children, and the deaths of at least 6 infants.1 The cause of these 
health issues was discovered to be melamine, a nitrogen-rich chemical usually used for 
the manufacture of fertilizers, plastics, laminates, paints and adhesives. Toxic when 
consumed by humans, melamine can cause renal failure and dysfunction, a fact that was 
known years before this scandal.2 In 2008 it was discovered that workers at Sanlu, one of 
the leading dairy companies in China, were adding melamine to milk in order to make it 
appear to have a higher protein content, rendering it more marketable and of higher 
monetary value. Melamine usage was highly concentrated in the production of baby 
formula. The apparently nutrient rich infant formula would seem to be highly beneficial 
to the health of babies and motivate parents to buy it, but the addition of melamine was 
potentially lethal.  
News about Sanlu’s melamine-tainted baby formula first reached the media in late 
August (although Sanlu officials had known about the contamination for many months) 
and it quickly spread through national and international media. Ironically, Sanlu was 
officially recognized only 8 months earlier for its quality and standards, including for its 
                                                 
1 Xiu Changbai. (2010). Melamine in milk products in China: Examining the factors that 
led to the deliberate use of the contaminant. Food Policy, 35(5), 464. 
2 Pei Xiaofeng et al. (2011). The China melamine milk scandal and its implications for 
food safety regulation. Food Policy, 36(3), 415. 
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infant formula.3 The company was required to recall all of its dairy products and was 
forced into bankruptcy because of the revenue loss caused by this recall. In Chinese 
courts, two people were sentenced to death for adding melamine to the milk and then 
selling it to the manufacturers. Many of the company’s leaders were fined and 
imprisoned; the company’s general manager and chairwoman was sentenced to four life 
terms in prison. 4 Adding to the atmosphere of fear throughout China was the discovery 
of melamine in almost all dairy products throughout the country. There was a worldwide 
recall of all Chinese products that contained dairy, even candies. Blame for these 
incidents was found everywhere and new legislation was drawn up to help improve food 
safety regulations. Nevertheless, despite the severe punishments and new legislation in 
the three years since this scandal, food safety violations have become commonplace in 
China’s media and melamine has not disappeared from the dairy industry. Exploding 
watermelons, fake tofu preserved with formaldehyde, and clenbuterol-fed pigs dominate 
the daily headlines, and reports of melamine-tainted milk continue; it is as if nothing has 
changed. 
The Chinese people were baffled by these events; how could their government 
have allowed this to happen? Exacerbating matters was the fact that this was not the first 
incident in the dairy industry. In 2003 it was discovered that many companies in the dairy 
industry were producing substandard or fake milk powder. This led to the deaths of 12 
babies and severe cases of malnutrition in hundreds of babies, but there were no changes 
in government regulation. In response some people have turned to creating co-ops and 
                                                 
3 Chen Shumei. (2009). Shame or sham: Rethinking China’s milk powder scandal from 
legal perspective. Journal of Risk Research, 12(6), 726. 
4 Xiu Changbai. (2010). Melamine in milk products in China: Examining the factors that 
led to the deliberate use of the contaminant. Food Policy, 35(5), 464. 
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growing their own food, but many do not have that opportunity and are forced to continue 
to buy food of mysterious provenance. Trust of the dairy industry in China has not yet 
returned and today many middle and upper class parents of young children only buy 
imported baby formula or buy it in travels to Korea, Japan or Hong Kong;5 even post 
offices in Chinatowns in the United States are stocked with infant formula to send back to 
relatives in China. Western restaurant chains, such as KFC, that were thought to be safe, 
now have records of high contamination and some government ministries grow their own 
food for their employees. The Chinese people no longer know who to trust. 
Additionally, the rise in food safety concerns occurred concurrently with the 
widespread change in food consumption patterns in China and an equally drastic change 
in food production. In the past 30 years, food consumption patterns have changed from 
eight parts grain, one part meat-poultry-fish, and one part vegetables-fruit to four parts 
grain, three parts meat-poultry-fish, and three parts vegetables-fruit. 6 Consumption of 
grain, which once was the only staple of the Chinese diet, is now declining and a rising 
proportion of grains is going towards animal feed rather than human consumption. 
Similar to other developing countries with rising incomes, there is no longer a clear 
divide between a staple food, in this case rice, and luxury foods such as meat.  
Changing consumption patterns have caused equally drastic changes in 
production patterns and alterations in production. Brand new industries, such as beef, 
have quickly entered the market on a massive scale and are now booming. Meat 
production, for example, rose from 11.1 million tons in 1978 to 74.43 million tons in 
                                                 
5 K.B. Richburg. (2011, August 11). China seeks to address food-safety crisis. The 
Washington Post. Retrieved from http://lexisnexis.com, 1. 
6 Philip Huang. (2011). China’s new-age farms and their vertical integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2), 110. 
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2005.7 Much of this growth was supported by the government as it encouraged farmers to 
diversify and break away from only farming grain or pork.8 This growth has also been 
driven by the changing appetites and incomes of the Chinese people. As the middle class 
in China has grown, demand for “richer” foods has grown, and meat and dairy have 
become common items in the Chinese diet. Therefore more meat and dairy are being 
produced in order to meet the demands of consumption. 
Because of the rising consumption of food and changes in production of food over 
the past twenty years, China has had to adjust from being a country concerned about food 
security, having enough food, to being a country that is more concerned with food safety, 
the quality of the food. Due to the high profile of food safety scandals since 2008, food 
safety has become an extremely important issue for the current Chinese government. 
During celebrations for the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party this July, a 
high level report was issued urging the government to make food safety a national 
security issue. Food safety is considered to be at the heart of social stability, which 
President Hu Jintao continuously stresses as one of China’s more important issues. 9  
Recently a campaign has begun to teach the Chinese people more about the importance of 
food safety, to care about food safety, and alert farmers to potentially hazardous farming 
                                                 
7 Peter Li. (2009). Exponential Growth, Animal Welfare, Environmental and Food Safety 
Impact: The Case of China’s Livestock Production. Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, 22, 221. 
8 Although most farms were concentrated in grain production 30 years ago, since it was 
the main staple of the Chinese diet, pork production was also extremely common. Pork 
has always been the most consumed meat in China. Pork is included here because of the 
commonplace consumption of pork, even 30 years ago. The government encouraged the 
production of other meats, because of pork’s existing popularity. 
9 (2011, July 9). Getting to grips with food safety. South China Post. Retrieved from 
http://lexisnexis.com. 
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practices.10 The government is even offering rewards to informants who provide 
information about tainted food and protection from the companies they are reporting.11 
This is part of a year long effort that aims to improve food safety in China through 
education and raising awareness about food safety. 
These efforts are largely ad hoc, impractical and cannot offer a long-term 
solution to the problem at large. Growing your own food is only sustainable for a small 
portion of the population as is buying only imported infant formula. China’s income is 
growing, but a large portion of the population is still extremely poor and therefore will 
not be able to purchase foods from trustworthy brands or feed their babies imported 
formula. Education about food safety on the other hand is important, but the consumer 
does not have much power, even when educated, to control food safety. Another solution 
offered by the Chinese government, has been harsher punishment for offenders as a way 
to deter farmers, middlemen and business-owners from producing unsafe food, but this is 
not a solution, only a demonstration of the government’s lack of power.12 Two people 
were put to death and one person was sentenced to life in prison after the melamine-milk 
scandal with Sanlu and food safety issues remain; harsher punishments in this case seem 
to be ineffective. Additionally the only way the people learn of food safety issues is 
through the media, which in some cases has been responsible for escalating the scandals 
and has led to results when the government has not. Therefore, these solutions are only 
                                                 
10 Lan Xinzhen. (2011, June 30). Improving food safety: The government takes a tougher 
stance on processors and producers violating food safety standards. Beijing Review. 
Retrieved from http://www.bjreview.com/. 
11 (2011, July 9). Getting to grips with food safety. South China Post. Retrieved from 
http://lexisnexis.com. 
12 Lan Xinzhen. (2011, June 30). Improving food safety: The government takes a tougher 
stance on processors and producers violating food safety standards. Beijing Review. 
Retrieved from http://www.bjreview.com. 
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viable in the short-term; the long-term solutions and the problem of regulating food 
safety remains. 
 
MAJOR PROBLEMS AFFECTING FOOD SAFETY 
Scholars and government officials blame these food safety issues on four main 
factors: the wide dispersion of farms in China, the poor structure of commerce, the 
fragmentation of the food safety regulatory system and weakness of local 
implementation. First, some scholars have pointed to the structure and wide dispersion of 
farms in China. Agriculture in China is based on the small family farm with the vast 
majority of Chinese farms having less than 10 workers. Small scale farming in China has 
dated as far back as the 1600s. More recently, the household responsibility system 
reinforces this small-scale structure by dividing land usage equally among residents of a 
town or village. Since land is scarce and is being divided between many people, the farms 
run by each family unit are very small, usually just more than one acre.13 Officials and 
some Chinese economists argue that the small farms hinder regulatory measures, because 
the sheer number and wide dispersion of small farms is hard to physically regulate. There 
is not enough manpower to monitor so many farms. Since the contamination of many 
foods, including milk in 2008, happened before it reached the processing plant, it further 
supports the idea that the large dispersion of farms is too great for effective regulation.14 
                                                 
13 Philip Huang. (2011). China’s new-age farms and their vertical integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2), 111. 
14 Yu Xiaodong. (2001, June 1). Farmers, corporations, and the government: Who’s to 
Blame? News China, 15. 
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They argue for horizontal integration, large-scale industrial farms based on the model of 
the American agribusiness system.15  
A second problem that scholars say is to blame for the food safety scandals 
throughout China is the poor structure of commerce. The structure of commerce in China 
is highly unorganized; therefore scholars argue that the process from production to 
consumption should be streamlined in order to ensure regulation and safety.16 Sanlu was 
once the largest producer of dairy in all of China, but almost all of the milk came from 
small farmers and was not supplied by Sanlu itself.17 The commercial structure linking 
farm to store includes many middlemen, creating many places for error. For the 
production of dairy for example, the farmers take their cows from the farms to the local 
milk collecting stations where the cows are milked. From there the milk is sent by a 
middleman to a processing and manufacturing plant where the raw milk is processed and 
changed into many different forms of dairy. From the manufacturing plant it goes to the 
wholesalers, to the retails, and finally to the consumers.18 During the melamine scandal, 
melamine was added at the stage after the milk stations by the middlemen. There were no 
checks before the milk from the middlemen went into processing, leaving room for many 
flaws. By contrast scandals in the pork industry occur mostly on the farm. When the pork 
reaches the processing plant, the only quality control at the plant checks the protein 
                                                 
15 Philip Huang. (2011). China’s new-age farms and their vertical integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2), 111. 
16 Ibid., 111. 
17 Yu Xiaodong. (2001, June 1). Farmers, corporations, and the government: Who’s to 
Blame? News China, 15. 
18 Xiu Changbai. (2010). Melamine in milk products in China: Examining the factors that 
led to the deliberate use of the contaminant. Food Policy, 35(5), 465. 
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content of the meat.19 There are few checks for additives or hazardous chemicals when 
the pork arrives at the processing plant, therefore many problems can go unnoticed. The 
commercial process from farm to consumer has too many steps, so there are also many 
places where the process can go wrong and unsafe food can slip through the cracks. 
The broken commercial chain leads to the third problem that scholars highlight, 
central government regulation. Central government regulatory measures for food safety 
are highly fragmented and hence are considered to be ineffective. As many as thirteen 
different ministries and agencies are responsible for some element of food safety 
regulation. By contrast in the United States, a similarly large agricultural giant, only two 
agencies, the FDA and the USDA, are responsible for food safety regulation and 
implementation. The FDA controls all but two industries, meat and poultry, which are 
regulated by the USDA. This allows for laws and regulations to be uniform and easier to 
follow since there is only one regulation, not many regulations and regulatory agencies 
acting on the same item in different ways. 20 China’s system of regulation, broken over so 
many different agencies and ministries allows for more mistakes, weaker regulations, and 
unclear and overlapping jurisdictions. When the power to declare certain foods fit to eat 
is given to multiple ministries, the consumer can be faced with an extremely confusing 
situation and retailers will not know which foods are safe to sell. For example, when 
cancer-causing chemicals were found to be in vermicelli, the General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ) declared 30 brands of 
vermicelli fit for consumption, but the Ministry of Health (MoH) only listed 7 brands fit 
                                                 
19 Sun Zhe. (2011, June 1). When medievalism meets the modern marketplace. News 
China, 20. 
20 (2011, Sep. 6). Food Safety is Still a Critical Issue in China. China Daily. 
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for consumption.21 The consumer was given the task of deciding which ministry was 
more trustworthy, and stores were not forced to remove certain brands since it was on one 
of the ministries’ lists. Furthermore, the multiple regulatory agencies create a slow flow 
of information since many of the agencies are competitive and refuse to work together 
and the fragmented system allows blame to be passed around without officially blaming 
any one agency or individual. 22 
Another element increasing the fragmentation of the regulatory system in China is 
the food safety laws that give each ministry its regulatory duties. China did not have a 
strict food safety law until after the melamine incident in 2008. Prior to the Food and 
Safety Law, passed in 2009, China’s only law regulating food safety was the Food 
Hygiene Law of the People’s Republic of China of 1995.23 This law was related to food 
safety, but spread the regulatory power to many different agencies as described above. 
The first law targeted directly at issues of food safety was the Food and Safety Law, 
instituted as a result of the melamine food scandal in 2008. This law attempted to 
streamline the regulatory process, but its power is also spread over many ministries and 
agencies in the government. It created the State Council Food Safety Commission, a 
commission that focuses on food additives, edible farm products and food processing, but 
the power of this commission is again hindered by the fragmentation of the system. None 
of the ministries or agencies wants to relinquish control over their areas of focus or the 
added revenue of regulation, maintaining the system of fragmentation that exists today. 
                                                 
21 Tam Weikeung, and Yang Dali. (2005). Food Safety and the Development of 
Regulatory Institutions in China. Asian Perspective, 29(4), 15. 
22 Ibid., 13. 
23 Chen Shumei. (2009). Shame or sham: Rethinking China’s milk powder scandal from 
legal perspective. Journal of Risk Research, 12(6), 732. 
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Regulatory agencies also need to implement a plan to educate farmers about safe 
farming practices. The changing levels of food consumption described above have caused 
a proportional change in production fostering a change in the methods of production. The 
methods that the farmers use are not always safe, but most farmers are uneducated and do 
not know what safe farming practices are. In order to be competitive, small-scale farmers 
have to adopt possibly unsafe measures to increase their output. In pig farming for 
example, farmers used to feed their pigs homemade slop made of grain, yams and other 
waste food around the house. Today, most pigs are fed corn and soy meal mixed with 
additives that supposedly speed growth.24 In the past, farmers kept pigs for a year or more 
to reach a weight of around 80 kilograms. Now after only four or five months of growth, 
a pig can weigh as much as 100 kilograms.25 Organic and locally grown feeding methods 
have disappeared and farmers have to use modern tactics to compete with other farmers. 
There has also been an increase in the use of drugs to keep animals alive, or stimulate and 
enhance their growth. Antibiotics are used to combat or prevent diseases, and stimulants 
such as clenbuterol are used to add meat to the body of a pig, enhancing the leanness of 
the meat, without a thought being given to how these drugs will affect the humans who 
consume the meat.26 Many of these additives have been around for years, but no one has 
educated the farmers about the harm that the additives can cause. For example, many 
farmers receive their pig feed from a company and they are told that this feed will make 
the pigs leaner. After hearing this the farmers do not question why the feed makes pigs 
                                                 
24 Sun Zhe. (2011, June 1). When medievalism meets the modern marketplace. News 
China, 17. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Peter Li. (2009). Exponential Growth, Animal Welfare, Environmental and Food 
Safety Impact: The Case of China’s Livestock Production. Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, 22, 228. 
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leaner because the farmer receives more money when the pigs are leaner. In the case of 
milk, farmers admit that “protein powder” of unclear origin was added to milk for years 
before the scandal was discovered in 2008.27 In the United States the USDA is 
responsible for educating farmers about safe farming practices, but in China the agencies 
seem to have ignored the problem. Regulatory agencies need to take responsibility not 
only for the food, but also for the farmers and educate them on safe farming practices. 
Finally, scholars argue that food safety problems have proliferated because 
implementation of the existing laws is very weak. Implementation of regulations is weak 
not only because of the fragmentation of the regulatory system mentioned above but also 
because of the difficulty of implementing national rules and laws on a local level. The 
Chinese government is highly bureaucratic and is organized in many layers. It runs from 
central to provincial, to city, to prefecture, to county, to town or township and so on. It is 
difficult for leaders on the central and provincial levels to make the leaders on the town 
and township levels follow the rules set by the central government. The local government 
often has closer ties to the local community than to the central government, so it is less 
likely to listen to the central government if their actions benefit the local community. As 
stated earlier, farming in China is highly dispersed and the farms are small, usually just 
over an acre and employ 10 or fewer people. Therefore the central government must rely 
on the local government to enforce laws and regulations. Enforcing these regulations can 
be difficult because if the illegal practices gain more money for the town, the local 
official is less likely to enforce the regulation because it damages the local economy and 
                                                 
27 Gordon Fairclough. (2008, September 3). Tainting of milk is open secret in China. 
Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://lexisnexis.com. 
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hurts the local official’s evaluations by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
Furthermore revenue generation is often more important than food safety regulations 
which can limit local growth.28 Corruption at the local level is also a large problem. Local 
officials often overlook violations when personal bribes are offered and, in order to create 
more revenue for the region, local regulatory agencies will frequently fine businesses 
instead of halting their practices when a violation is discovered.29 Additionally, since 
manufacturer’s products are usually sent from the rural areas where the products are 
produced to urban areas where the products are consumed, local officials are less likely to 
crack down on individuals or businesses that produce fake or substandard goods if it is 
not affecting the local people. The melamine scandal that set off a wide range of food 
safety inquiries began at the local level where melamine was added to the milk, long 
before it reached the processing center.30 Therefore local level implementation and 
federal implementation need to improve in order for there to be progress. 
 
FOUR SOLUTIONS 
Scholars also propose four solutions that align directly with solving the four 
problems: transform Chinese agriculture, restructure agricultural commercial 
organization, streamline the regulatory bureaucracy, and improve local implementation. 
First, some scholars suggest that farms must be reformed so that safer practices are 
encouraged and so that regulation becomes easier. Most officials and many Chinese 
                                                 
28 Tam Weikeung and Yang Dali. (2005). Food Safety and the Development of 
Regulatory Institutions in China. Asian Perspective, 29(4), 17. 
29 Ibid. 20. 
30 Yu Xiaodong. (2001, June 1). Farmers, corporations, and the government: Who’s to 
Blame? News China, 15. 
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scholars argue that the only option that would improve farming methods in China is 
horizontal integration, taking all of the small farms and combining them based on the 
American agribusiness form. Farms in the United States are large and mechanized with 
few workers. The average size of a farm in America is 418 acres per farm, 400 times the 
average size of farms in China.31 Scholars argue that more urbanization and the removal 
of farmers from land to cities would allow for the creation of large-scale farms similar to 
American farms and complete the modernization of China.32 Officials and scholars argue 
for large scale farms not only for the continued modernization of China, but also because 
large-scale farms would be easier to regulate than small farms since there would be fewer 
and they would not be as dispersed. Processors could assume that all the raw materials 
coming from each farm would be of the same quality and would only need to test a 
sample of the goods in order to determine their quality. In theory creating a large scale 
agribusiness system would be much easier to regulate, but in practice it would not only be 
hard to transform the current agricultural system, but it would also potentially harm the 
farmers, whom they are ostensibly attempting to help. In India for example, privatization 
of land has resulted in not only many farmers losing their land, but also a large class of 
urban poor.33 Furthermore there are only six countries in the entire world with an 
agricultural policy based on large-scale farming methods.34 In China, where small-scale 
                                                 
31 USDA. (2007). Farm Numbers. USDA Census of Agriculture. Retrieved from 
www.agcensus.gov. 
32 Philip Huang. (2011). China’s new-age farms and their vertical integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2), 111. 
33 Yu Xiaodong. (2011, June 1). Why privatized farmland is not the solution. News 
China, 23. 
34 Ibid. 
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farming has dominated for centuries, the creation of large-scale agribusiness would be 
extremely complex and potentially impossible to complete. 
The second solution offered by scholars and officials is to restructure commerce 
from production to consumption, so that regulation is easier and consumers know where 
their food originates. One solution offered by the Ministry of Commerce is an electronic 
tracking system at grocery stores. 35 The system is currently still in testing stages, but is 
fully in effect in 10 cities in China. The system tracks meat and vegetables from farm to 
store and consumers can check where the food has come from by scanning the barcode at 
the store. This tracking system is one of the Chinese government’s solutions to the food 
safety problem and they plan to have it instituted throughout the entire country by the end 
of the 12th five-year-plan.  
Another possible method of restructuring commerce is to streamline vertical 
integration, the process from farm to store. Three main options have been offered; 
“dragon-head” enterprises such as Sanlu, specialty co-ops, or independently owned farms 
and processing enterprises.36 A “dragon-head” enterprise is one large company that 
collects goods from small farms, and processes and markets them, which so far seems to 
be the norm in China. Cooperative organizations on the other hand are a coalition of 
farmers that control production, processing and marketing. This is different from the 
“dragon-head” enterprises because the farmers are all part owners of the cooperative and 
there are safeguards built into the cooperative that protect farmers against an adverse 
market environment. Cooperatives are more appealing to farmers, because they receive a 
                                                 
35 (2011, July 30). China Extends Food tracking Project. China Daily. Retrieved from 
http://lexisnexis.com. 
36 Philip Huang. (2011). China’s new-age farms and their vertical integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2), 117. 
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larger portion of the profits, but it is uncertain if all the farmers will actually have a voice 
in each cooperative or whether it will act more like a “dragon-head” enterprise. The final 
option is the easiest to control, because in this option the processing centers have their 
own farms. The structure is similar to the “dragon-head” enterprise, but the enterprise 
owns and cares for its own farm. This method is being touted as the most secure method 
of farming because the enterprise has the most control over product quality and product 
safety. According to scholars, the most effective solution and future outcome will be a 
continuous mix of the three systems.37 
A third solution offered by scholars is that government regulations should be 
streamlined in order to make regulatory measures possible and avoid conflict between 
ministries. Currently the multiple regulatory agencies all act in similar, if not the same, 
fields. This creates confusion, multiple regulations for the same product, and a system 
where it is easy to escape blame. The Chinese government has attempted to make 
changes in regulatory agencies and streamline the process since 2008. The new Food and 
Safety Law in 2009 was the first attempt at stricter food safety measures. According to 
the new regulations, no food can be sold inspection-free and food manufacturers are 
responsible for all recalls of food items. All additives must be approved, and there are 
now harsher penalties on violations of the food safety law. 38  But as mentioned above, 
this has not done much to stop food safety scandals and violations. In order to effectively 
regulate food safety, the government must either create a new food safety agency and 
strip existing agencies of their regulatory powers, or agencies responsible for food safety 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 128. 
38 Xiu Changbai. (2010). Melamine in milk products in China: Examining the factors that 
led to the deliberate use of the contaminant. Food Policy, 35(5), 468. 
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regulations must have more outlined and specific responsibilities. Currently the room for 
ambiguity within the law prevents effective regulation and many scholars think that 
China missed its chance for an effective regulatory system by passing the Food and 
Safety Law without clearly defined regulatory provisions.39 
The final possible solution to the food safety issues in China is to improve 
implementation at the local level by local officials. Currently the only solution for 
improving implementation of regulation is harsher punishments for violators of 
regulations. Punishments have increased from days in jail to years in jail and the 
strongest punishment is death.40 In recent months thousands of producers and processors 
have been arrested and questioned regarding their role in the contamination of goods, but 
harsher punishments are not the solution. The Chinese media and authorities mark these 
changes as a sign of improvement in the implementation and praise the government for 
these changes, but it is actually a sign of weak implementation since if the government 
was implementing the laws effectively, there would be fewer violations. In order to 
improve local implementation, China will have to change the way it reviews the work of 
the local level officials. Reviews of local officials given the task of regulating food safety 
should be based on the number of farms, manufacturers, and processors that pass food 
safety inspections. Fining individuals or companies and therefore gaining more money 
for the region should not be rewarded unless the fine results in an actual change in the 
actions of that individual or company. Evaluations should also look to discourage bribery 
                                                 
39 Tam Weikeung and Yang Dali. (2005). Food Safety and the Development of 
Regulatory Institutions in China. Asian Perspective, 29(4), 12. 
40 Lan Xinzhen. (2011, June 30). Improving food safety: The government takes a tougher 
stance on processors and producers violating food safety standards. Beijing Review. 
Retrieved from http://www.bjreview.com/. 
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and corruption, although it is a problem throughout the Chinese government. This level 
of local implementation is both one of the largest problems facing the improvement of 
food safety in China and possibly one of the hardest problems to solve. 
 
CASE STUDIES 
Through the examination of two industries, dairy and pork, the proposed causes 
and subsequent solutions will be examined. Dairy and pork make good case studies 
because of the importance of each industry in China and past food safety issues that have 
recently occurred. Dairy, although it has not always been a popular industry in China, is 
currently growing exponentially and is becoming extremely important in the Chinese 
diet. Consumption of dairy, like many other foods in China, is increasing rapidly, as the 
income of the Chinese increases and the Chinese diet continues to change.41 In the past, 
milk was only used to feed the young and the elderly since it is full of important nutrients 
that are necessary for the health of the young and old. But as incomes increase, more 
Chinese are consuming dairy. The increase in consumption of milk in developing 
countries is a worldwide phenomenon, but in China the production and consumption 
increased exponentially from 8 million tons in 2000 to 36 million tons 8 years later.42 It is 
a luxury they can now afford.  
As described above, the dairy industry has also faced many safety scandals and 
was the impetus for change in the regulatory system. Melamine was not the first scandal 
in the dairy industry. As mentioned above, the incident in 2003 caused the deaths of 12 
                                                 
41 F. Fuller et al. (2006). Got milk? The rapid rise of China’s dairy sector and its future 
prospects. Food Policy, 31, 203. 
42 Pei Xiaofeng et al. (2011). The China melamine milk scandal and its implications for 
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babies and severe cases of malnutrition in others, but there were no actions taken to 
prevent similar incidents in the future.43 Before the melamine scandal in 2008 the leading 
dairy companies were not required to undergo testing although there was a history of 
unsafe products in that industry. At the end of December 2011 another safety issue in the 
Chinese dairy industry was uncovered. Mengniu, one of China’s leading dairy industries, 
and Changfu Dairy Company in Fujian were found to have milk contaminated with 
carcinogenic toxins caused by moldy cattle feed. The milk came from a Mengniu 
subsidiary company in Meishan, Sichuan and from Changfu’s dairies in Fujian.44 This 
milk never made it to the market since it was caught in government spot testing before 
being sold by retailers, but it has shaken the already fragile trust that the Chinese people 
have in the Chinese dairy industry.45 Mengniu claimed that this toxin was allowed into 
the milk by mistake and that normally the company tests for this toxin, but the testing 
equipment for this toxin is usually 4,000 to 6,000 yuan per unit and therefore many dairy 
companies do not actually test for this toxin.46 This is not Mengniu first safety issue of 
the year; in November high levels of bacteria were found in Mengniu’s ice cream 
products and in April 251 students fell ill after drinking Mengniu milk in their cafeteria.47 
These scandals have decreased sales for Chinese dairy companies and have increased 
sales for foreign dairy companies hurting a potentially important domestic industry. 
Dairy, because of its growing importance in China and because of the multiple scandals, 
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is a highly desired commodity with an unsafe history, making it not only an interesting 
case study, but also important for an inspection of China’s food safety.  
Pork, on the other hand, is a staple meat in Chinese cuisine and although the 
production of other meat products has grown, pork remains the most commonly 
consumed meat in all of China.48 The Chinese prefer pork to other meats and in many 
dishes there is some form of pork. The Chinese character for meat is the character for 
pork, for it to be beef or chicken another character must be added. The pork industry has 
more recently been investigated for food safety issues. This past April it was discovered 
that a subsidiary of Shuanghui, the largest meat processor in China, was found to have 
clenbuterol-tainted pork.49 Also known as “lean meat powder”, clenbuterol is fed to pigs 
in order to decrease the fat content of the meat and therefore increase the value of the 
meat. Clenbuterol is a stimulant that is used illegally as a steroid and as a weight loss 
agent in many countries. Some countries also use clenbuterol in asthma medicine, but 
clenbuterol in all forms is illegal in the United States.50 In China, clenbuterol is illegal in 
animal feed since once ingested by humans it can cause dizziness, heart palpitations and 
profuse sweating in humans; some studies even link long-term consumption to cancer.51 
The clenbuterol was found in pig feed, which is usually given to farmers by 
manufacturers, who tell the farmers that the feed will make the pigs grow faster and make 
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their meat leaner. Farmers earn more money the leaner their meat is, so they do not ask 
questions. Since this incident occurred more than three years after the melamine milk 
scandal, this case study is revealing as a way to analyze the changes since the scandal and 
why the methods of regulation are still ineffective. 
By examining data specific to each case study, the flaws in the regulation of each 
industry will be examined. In order to determine whether the structure of farming in 
China impedes regulation of agriculture in China, the geographic dispersion and size of 
farms in each respective industry will be examined through raw census and agricultural 
data, and through reports on the ratio of small farms to large scale farms and the 
percentage of goods that come from each farm. By examining these data, the true 
structure of farming in each industry will be uncovered and the effect of farming structure 
on regulation will be examined. Then, using reports on the past, current and potential 
structures of commerce, including those on the existing major companies or dragon-head 
enterprises in each industry, a broader picture of commerce in China will be examined 
and possible flaws and solutions will be laid out. In order to examine whether fragmented 
regulation is responsible for the flaws of regulation in each industry, laws governing 
regulation of industry, ministries in charge of each industry, and the role of education of 
farmers in each industry will be studied. Finally, in order to investigate local levels of 
implementation, newspaper articles will be examined for stories of lack of local 
implementation or trials and subsequent sentencing of local officials during food safety 
scandals. This information will provide greater perspective on how local implementation 
works and how it can be improved. 
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Food safety is a problem plaguing China as they modernize and develop into a 
fully industrialized and developed country. Using these case studies this thesis will 
examine the proposed causes in the context of each industry and determine whether the 
causes are valid in each case. In this thesis I hope to uncover the root causes of food 
safety issues in China and what China can do to improve its food safety record and 
prevent more deadly food scandals from occurring. The first chapter will examine 
China’s agricultural structure, and propose solutions to this side of food safety concerns. 
The second chapter will expose China’s agricultural commercial structure and examine 
ways in which this structure can be improved. The third and final chapter will expose 
flaws in China’s regulatory system, examine how it can become stronger, explain China’s 
implementation flaws and discuss what can be done to fix these problems. After 
examining these four main issues the true problems will be identified and possible 
solutions will be proposed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURE 
INTRODUCTION 
Many Chinese scholars and officials blame food safety issues on the structure of 
farming in China. Currently, the agricultural system in China is highly dispersed and 
based on small scale farms, which makes it hard to physically regulate. Most farms are 
run by families with less than ten workers and on less than one acre of land.52 This has 
been the method of farming in China for hundreds of years and has been reinforced by 
the more recent household responsibility system, which divides land usage among all the 
families in each village. Although the urban population recently surpassed the rural 
population for the first time in all of Chinese history reaching 51.27%, the rural 
population is still extremely large. 53 Therefore each plot of land farmed by each family is 
extremely small. This structure is hard to physically regulate so scholars argue for 
horizontal integration of farms, or restructuring farms to create large scale farms in order 
to improve regulation. Scholars argue this structure, based on the American large scale 
agribusiness model would be much easier to regulate and would improve overall food 
safety, but raw data shows otherwise.54 Most agricultural processing companies do 
receive their raw materials from smaller farms, but commercial ties between small scale 
farmers and large processing companies create a larger commercially connected network 
that should be easier to regulate. Therefore the American large scale model would be 
redundant and cause more harm than good. 
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The model that Chinese scholars believe China needs to emulate, the American 
agribusiness model, is based on large scale farms owned by individuals and large 
companies that grow the majority of crops and raise the majority of livestock in the 
United States. Scholars argue that this method of farming would be easier to regulate 
because there would be fewer farms, therefore less manpower would be need to inspect 
the farms. 55  Furthermore the farms would be more industrialized and have more modern 
production. Therefore, food would theoretically be safer. Although the system might be 
easier to regulate, the creation of this system would be very difficult. Currently there are 
only six countries in the entire world with large scale agribusiness farming structure; the 
rest of the world still depends on small scale local farming.56 In the United States most of 
these large scale farms are corporate farms, owned by the companies, not the farmers 
themselves and the size of each farm is monumental; the average size of farms in the 
United States is 418 acres, 400 times the size of Chinese farms.57  
The United States’ agricultural system is vastly different from China’s 
agricultural system, but it is not as uniform as many Chinese scholars and officials would 
like others to believe. Most agricultural sales in the United States do come from large 
scale agribusiness farms, but the majority of farms are categorized as small; farms with 
100 or less heads of livestock are categorized as small in the United States, but would be 
large farms in China. In the dairy industry, almost 50% of farms are categorized as small 
with less than 50 heads of cattle. And farms with less than 100 heads of cattle make up 
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about 70% of the farms.58 These small farms are numerous, but 81% of sales come from 
24% of the businesses that tend to be corporate owned.59 In the pork industry there is a 
similar trend with 6% of the farms, corporate farms, accounting for 33% of the sales, and 
family run farms, although they account for 85% of the farms, only account for 44% of 
the sales.60 The USDA and FDA have to regulate both the small farms as well as the large 
farms. The US model of corporate farming, therefore, could solve some of China’s 
regulatory problems, but not even the United States has an entirely corporate farming 
based agriculture. 
The United States’ system, although theoretically useful, would not only be 
difficult to carry out, but could also hurt the farmers and damage the agricultural industry. 
As mentioned in the introduction, India attempted to change its agricultural system after 
the corporate farming model and the result was a large number of landless peasants who 
moved to the cities and created the vast slums surrounding most cities in India.61 If China 
decided to transform its agricultural system it would possibly end in a similar result. 
Creation of a large agribusiness system of agriculture would necessitate the removal of 
peasants that currently farm the land.62 China has already experienced the removal and 
transplantation of large numbers of rural people such as during the creation of the Three 
Gorges Dam. Millions of people were moved from their ancestral homes and forced to 
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move thousands of miles away. Repercussions from this project are still being dealt with 
today. Logistically, the transformation to this system would be very difficult. Given this 
information, creation of a Chinese system similar to that of the United States’ would be 
very complicated. 
The argument that agricultural reform will be able to improve food safety needs to 
be examined from an empirical standpoint in order to determine the effect agricultural 
reform would have on food safety. As outlined in the introduction, the geographic 
dispersion and size of farms will be examined through raw census and agricultural data, 
reports on the ratio of small farms to large scale farms, and the percentage of goods that 
come from each farm will be examined in order to discover the true agricultural structure 
in China. Two case studies, the dairy and pork industries, are best suited for this 
inspection because of recent problems in each industry. Furthermore the two industries 
are good for comparison due to their respective histories in China; dairy is a relatively 
new industry while the pork industry is ancient. By examining these data specific to dairy 
and pork, the true structure of farming in each industry will be uncovered, the effect of 
farming structure on regulation will be examined, and proposed solutions will be 
analyzed. 
 
DAIRY 
Dairy production in China is on the rise. According to the China Statistical 
Yearbook, from 1995 to 2009 production of milk increased from 6,728,000 tons to 
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37,326,000 tons.63 China is also the world’s third largest producer of fresh milk, a recent 
development, as China became one of the top ten producers of milk only ten years ago.64 
Dairy is a fairly new industry in China, that has benefited both from governmental and 
foreign support and has expanded greatly in the past decade, but China’s consumption of 
milk per capita is much below that of Western countries.65 This could be attributed to 
lactose intolerance, which is very common in China, a large poor rural population that 
cannot always afford milk, and the comparative inefficiency of China’s dairy farms.66 
The dairy industry has grown exponentially as consumption and popularity of dairy 
increased and is still expanding as foreign companies enter the market. This booming 
industry has been plagued with breaches of safety regulations such as the melamine 
scandal of 2008 and the more recent issues with Mengniu in December of 2011. This has 
lead to general mistrust of the entire industry and to larger food safety questions such as 
why does the dairy industry appear to have the most food safety issues in China. 
Therefore the dairy industry is important to analyze because of its increasing popularity 
and because of its poor safety record. 
The dairy industry is a relatively new industry in China. Before the economic 
reform and opening up of China in 1978, farmers were told to farm few crops, but in the 
1980s agricultural restrictions loosened and farms were decollectivized. The rural 
agricultural communes that had dominated Chinese agriculture did raise production from 
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1950 to 1980, but left little room for rapid economic growth. The goal of the new system 
was to encourage individual agricultural growth and gave all farmers their own land to 
work on. Farmers were encouraged to diversify their crops and livestock. During this 
time dairy farming was strongly encouraged in Northern China, which has resulted in 
fairly localized production.  
The provinces that consistently produce the most milk are Hebei, Inner Mongolia 
and Heilongjiang.67 These provinces, along with parts of Shandong and Xinjiang are what 
make up China’s growing “dairy belt,” responsible for most dairy production in China as 
can be seen in the map below.68 In 2006, milk produced in Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, 
and Hebei accounted for half of the total milk output in all of China.69 The geography of 
Northern China (Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang and Northern Hebei) is characterized by 
large, cold and largely unpopulated grasslands, ideal conditions for grazing of cattle. The 
Chinese government has been encouraging the development of the dairy industry in this 
mostly agriculturally underdeveloped region as a way to utilize the land, increase dairy 
production, and increase rural incomes.70 
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Figure 1: Production of milk per region in China in 200971 
 
 Governmental encouragement of the dairy industry in Northern China began in 
the 1980s.72 This area did not have a strong agricultural industry and the geography 
appeared to be well suited to dairy farming. Local governments provided aid and 
subsidies to dairy farmers in order to encourage an increase in production. The Inner 
Mongolia provincial government even listed dairy processing production as the top 
agricultural priority for the entire autonomous region. Furthermore, “the governments of 
Shijiazhuang City and Tangshan City in Hebei province perceived the dairy industry as a 
pillar for development in general.” 73 Methods such as reducing taxes, decreasing 
regulations, and increasing loans to dairy companies greatly encouraged the production of 
dairy in the region. These governmental encouragements have created the “dairy belt” in 
Northern China. Although Beijing and Shanghai are also centers of dairy production, 
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most major dairy companies are centered in Northern China in Hohhot in Inner 
Mongolia, Harbin in Heilongjiang province, and Shijiazhuang and Tangshan in Hebei 
province. In 2005 these four cities produced nearly 40% of dairy in China with 70 
different dairy enterprises. 
Table 1: Liquid Milk and Dairy Products - Top Ten Cities by Sales Revenue74 
 
  
 
 
 
 Hohhot, the capital of Inner Mongolia, is the main hub of dairy production in 
Northern China. Home to two of the largest dairy companies in China, Mengniu and Yili, 
Hohhot is the fast growing dairy capital of China. From 1992 to 2006 production of 
cow’s milk in Hohhot alone increased from 35,447 tons to 2,277,884 tons.75 New dairies 
are built constantly and surrounding the city are thousands of small dairy farms. The 
China Dairy Association Headquarters is in Hohhot and the International Dairy Expo is 
being held in Hohhot this year.76 The dairy industry is even considered one of the main 
six industrial interests of the city due to the economic success of Mengnui and Yili.77 
Furthermore, Hohhot also has the largest concentration of dairy cows compared to any 
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No. Cities Province Market Share(%) Number of Enterprises 
1 Hohhot City InnerMongolia 17.02 7
2 Shijiazhuang City Hebei 9.97 13
3 Shanghai Shanghai 7.20 16
4 Harbin City Heilongjiang 5.53 16
5 Beijing Beijing 3.76 19
6 Guangzhou City Guangdong 2.71 10
7 Qiqihar City Heilongjiang 2.62 17
8 Tangshan City Hebei 2.37 17
9 Xi'an City Shaanxi 2.26 9
10 Changsha City Hunan 2.01 7
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other city in China and Hohhot’s leading dairy companies, Mengniu and Yili, account for 
almost a third of all milk production in China.78  
The concentrated production center of dairy, Hohhot, has its own concentrated 
centers of production. Dairy farming in this instance is not highly dispersed. Dairy 
production within the city of Hohhot is centered around 3 main areas in the city: Saihan 
city district, Horinger county, and Tumote Zuoqi Banner. Mengniu is based in Horinger 
county and Yili is based in Tumote Zuoqi Banner which accounts for their high level of 
production. Saihan city district has a higher level of dairy production because it is the 
most spacious district with the lowest population density leaving room for farming dairy 
cows. Mengniu and Yili, the two largest dairy companies in China get much of their milk 
from these districts, but also have milking stations throughout the country where local 
farmers go to milk the cows. From those stations, the milk is then sent to the large 
processing centers in Hohhot. The individual cows that are the source of Mengniu and 
Yili’s milk are raised mostly in smaller scale farms, but the milk is all sent to a central 
location creating a hub and spoke structure of agriculture. This system creates a central 
processing center where most milk in the region goes to two or three enterprises and is 
then processed. Although the two companies use dairy from farms throughout the 
country, the commercial vertical integration creates a central, not dispersed, production 
center. 
The farming structure in Hohhot is replicated throughout the areas of China with 
vast natural grassland where dairy farms depend on grazing. In the eastern section of 
China cows are primarily kept in backyard sheds and are fed more grain. Dairy farms 
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around cities, such as Bright Dairy, use more modern technology and are fairly large 
scale.79 Although large scale dairies do exist, over 90% of all farms have less than 20 
cows and are located in a small household, or “backyard farms.”80 In 2009 there were 
5,820 farms with over 200 cows that accounted for 0.24% of total farms.81 There are 
many more small farms than large farms, but the number of large farms has been growing 
as can be seen in the table below. In 2003 farms with 20 cows or less accounted for 
almost all farms in the country and for 72.6% of the total output. In 2009 the number of 
small farms had decreased significantly, but more importantly, the output of large farms 
increased and the output of small farms decreased to 57.4% of the total output. 
Table 2: Size Distribution of China Dairy Farms in 201082 
 
These statistics point to a change in the structure of dairy farming in China. Small 
farms are still the norm in dairy farming, but the number of large scale farms are growing 
and their output is growing even faster. The trend for larger farms is most popular in 
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cities where the dairy companies have their own farms, but most dairy companies still get 
the raw milk from small scale local farmers. The dairy farms that utilized small scale 
farms also tend to control the economic and commercial supply chain and are vertically 
integrated. Vertical integration is becoming extremely popular and useful as it gives dairy 
processing companies more control throughout the dairy production process. However, 
local governments are also beginning to give incentives to large farms surrounding cities 
creating larger farms.  
 Given this information, scholars’ arguments for agricultural reform are tenuous. 
Scholars argue that farming in China is too dispersed for proper regulation, but data in the 
dairy industry shows that this argument does not apply. The Chinese dairy industry is 
fairly concentrated in Northern China. The majority of dairy is produced and processed in 
Northern China as well. This regional concentration refutes the argument that widespread 
farms are the cause of food safety issues because dairy farms are highly concentrated in 
Northern China. Another factor listed by scholars is the size of each farm. Most dairy 
farms in China are very small with less than 20 cows, but these dairy farms are also 
commercially connected with large dairy companies. The milking stations in rural 
villages when there is “backyard” farming, are owned by these companies. Commercial 
vertical integration of each farm creates a larger commercially connected network, that 
acts like a large scale farm. 
Therefore, since the small farms are connected to larger dairy processing 
companies, widespread horizontal integration of farms, or the creation of large scale 
farms, would be unnecessary. Dairy farms are effectively already large scale 
commercially. Very few dairy farmers sell directly to the market and nearly all dairy is 
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processed by these large processing companies. Dairy, as a regionally concentrated 
industry with vertical commercial integration does not fit the profile for agricultural 
reform that many scholars argue for. This can be attributed to the relative youth of the 
industry. The Chinese government has been able to plan the production of milk and has 
had a greater hand in its growth as an industry. This has allowed the dairy industry to be 
structured as it is today.  
 
PORK 
 
 The production of pork on the other hand, is widespread and fairly consistent 
throughout the country. Pork is the most commonly produced agricultural good in China 
and has been a staple in the Chinese diet for many years. China is the largest producer of 
pork with Chinese production of pork accounting for 47% of the world’s production of 
pork.83 Pigs have been a domesticated farm animal in China as early as the Han 
Dynasty.84 More recent studies have shown that domesticated pigs originated in China 
indicating that pig farming could have an even longer history, around 10,000 years.85 Pigs 
are attractive as farm animals because they are fairly self-sufficient and require little 
tending. Pigs were even used until fairly recently as sewer systems through pig toilets and 
garbage disposals; they were responsible for eating human refuse and feces. The average 
farmer could raise pigs based on the scraps of their meals or their crops. The ease of pig 
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farming combined with the long history of pig farming in China has led to production of 
pork in nearly every province with relatively equal outputs. 
Over the past 14 years production of pork in China has also been consistent. 
There has been a gradual increase from 480,510,000 tons of pork to 645,386,000 tons of 
pork.86 There were some fluctuations in those years, but there has been a general upward 
trend. This upward trend however is rather slow, compared to the production of milk, and 
is accommodating only the growth of the population and the changing Chinese diet. As 
mentioned in the introduction, as the income of the Chinese people rises, their 
consumption habits are changing leading to a diet based more on meat, milk and other 
fattier foods. This has caused a general increase in the production of pork, but because it 
is not a new industry like milk, the increase in production can only be attributed to 
increase in population and change in diets, not to growing popularity. 
Although production of pork is rather uniform across the country, there are some 
areas of China where the production of pork is greater. Pork production is most frequent 
in South and Central China and the provinces with the highest levels of production are 
Sichuan, Henan, and Hunan province.87 These provinces are all traditional agricultural 
bases in China; Sichuan has historically been known as the “Province of Abundance” 
because of its agricultural strength. Additionally Sichuan and Henan provinces are also 
the fourth and third most populous provinces, respectively. Therefore these three 
provinces have the highest production of pork in the country. Additionally, Shuanghui 
Group, the largest meat processing company in the nation, is headquartered in Luohe, 
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Henan, which is famous for its ham production. Although these three provinces have the 
highest production of pork, you can still see in the map below that production of pork is 
fairly high in every province. 
Figure 2: Number of pigs slaughtered per region in China in 200988 
The uniformity of pork production in China can be attributed to the history of the 
industry as well as the prevalence of pork in Chinese cuisine. Compared to the hub and 
spoke structure of milk, the production of pork is much more widespread across the 
country. Pork is an old industry in China and therefore has been based on small scale 
family farms, farms with less than 50 heads of hogs, for most of China’s history. 
However, recently more large scale farming and processing companies have started up in 
China. These farms are considered large if they have 50 or more heads of hogs. From 
1995 to 1999 the share of large scale farms rose from 13.6% to 21.5% and after 2000, 
many backyard farming households withdrew from the industry due to the rising costs of 
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pork farming and the low cost of pork.89 Therefore a rising percentage of large scale 
farms has increased to fill the void. Large scale farms still only produce 40% of all pork 
in the country. Most of the small scale farms in China no longer sell their pigs 
independently instead they work with larger companies who supply the feed, medicine 
and technology and then eventually process the pigs.90 Even the small scale farms are still 
connected to the large scale farms through integration of small scale with large 
businesses. 
Table 3: Production by large-scale farmer (50 head or above per year sloughed)91 
 
 Large scale pork farms are on the rise because of the rising costs of pork 
production. Pig feed, medicine, and other costs are becoming too expensive for small 
scale farmers to afford. Large scale farms can lower their cost per pig because they have 
so many pigs. Many companies now control from the farm to the store; Shuanghui even 
has its own supermarket, Shineway, where it can sell all of its goods. These companies 
also utilize small farms. In the pork industry, like the dairy industry, small farms still out-
number and out-produce the large scale farms. These small farms are vertically integrated 
into the larger commercial system, combining large scale production with small farms. 
                                                 
89 Jimin Wang & Hongbo Xiao. (2007). Pork Production in China. Institute of Developing 
Economies Japan External Trade Organization. Retrieved from http://d-arch.ide.go.jp. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
 37
 Although pig farming is widespread, the production of pork is vertically 
integrated, often by region commercially centralizing the industry. Like the dairy 
industry, this commercial vertical integration creates a system where horizontal 
integration is unnecessary. Fully industrialized large scale farms would not only be 
unnecessary for improving food safety, but would also harm the small farmers that 
dominate agriculture today. Pork is an older industry in China and therefore is much 
more scattered and widespread throughout the country, but its connections to larger 
processing companies creates a large horizontal structure. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The commercial vertical integration and growing numbers of large scale farms in 
the dairy and pork industries renders the proposed solution of agricultural horizontal 
integration inapplicable. Although the dairy and pork industries have different geographic 
and agricultural structures, the commercial and economic structures are very similar. The 
dairy industry does rely on more small farms than the pork industry, but both use a 
similar structure of vertical integration where the small farmers are connected 
commercially to larger processing companies. In dairy, small farmers rely on milking 
stations built and owned by companies such as Mengniu and Yili. That milk is later sent 
to these companies for processing. In the pork industry feed, medicine and technology are 
provided by the company that will eventually buy, slaughter, and process the pig. 
 This structure of commercial vertical integration acts very similar to horizontal 
integration and makes agricultural reform redundant. The current system already acts like 
large scale farming and agricultural reform would do more harm than good. Therefore it 
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appears that the structure of farming is not at fault. Dairy and pork both travel from small 
farms to the large processor. This large processor has the responsibility to inspect the 
goods and evaluate their safety. Therefore it is necessary to examine the commercial 
structure to see if there is a gap in the chain from farm to store that allows for food safety 
issues. 
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CHAPTER TWO: COMMERCIAL STRUCTURE 
INTRODUCTION 
 A second potential flaw on the path to food safety in China is the commercial 
structure of agriculture; how the raw goods get from farm to store. The structure of 
commerce in China is highly fragmented; therefore scholars argue that the process from 
production to consumption should be streamlined in order to ensure regulation and 
safety.92 Currently, in most industries the path from farm to processing center involves 
many middlemen creating multiple areas for problems and mistakes. This is partially 
related to the agricultural structure described in chapter one; large processing companies 
have to rely on small farms for their raw goods. Therefore from small farm to large 
processing center there are many stages. All of the stages need to be regulated creating 
more work for the regulatory agencies. Regulating the farm, the middlemen and the large 
company can require too much manpower and be difficult to accomplish. This is a 
problem because in both the dairy and pork industries, most safety issues have occurred 
before the milk or pork entered the processing center due to the negligence or 
malevolence of the middlemen. In 2008 for example, during the melamine scandal, 
melamine was added by the middlemen at the milking stations in order to increase their 
profit. The middlemen in this circumstance were not well supervised and therefore had 
the opportunity to add additives to the milk without being noticed. Given this information 
commercial structure needs to be streamlined or adapted in order to improve regulation of 
agriculture and therefore improve food safety.  
                                                 
92 Philip Huang. (2011). China’s new-age farms and their vertical integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2), 111. 
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Currently there are three main forms of agricultural commercial structure in 
China. Large scale enterprises, or dragon-head enterprises, which are connected to the 
small scale farmers, or commerce; cooperative organizations that connect from farm to 
store; and independent large companies that own their own farms and livestock. Dragon-
head enterprises are large scale businesses that are currently dominating Chinese 
agriculture. As described in chapter one, these large scale businesses are linked to small 
farms that provide the raw materials for processing. For example, a small farmer owns 
the pig, but feed, medicine, and technology all come from the main dragon-head 
processing company. The structure is preferred by central and local governments as can 
be seen through increased subsidies to large scale dragon-head enterprises.93 The 
government probably supports this system because it best follows the pattern of 
modernizing agriculture in China. Large technologically advanced processing companies 
are seen to be the future of Chinese agriculture, so the government supports the growth of 
these businesses.  It is also the most common and popular structure for both dairy and 
pork as large processing companies dominate both industries. Dairy companies such as 
Mengniu, Sanyuan, and Yili and pork processing companies such as Shuanghui and 
Zhengbang are all large scale and rely on small farmers for their goods. Although this 
structure is the most popular and is preferred by the government, it also has the history of 
the most safety issues and flaws. The melamine scandal of 2008, the clenbuterol scandal 
of April 2011 and the Mengniu safety issues of December 2011 were all partially caused 
by flaws in this commercial system.  
                                                 
93 Ibid., 120. 
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The second commercial system is cooperative organizations. These organizations 
are owned by members not the enterprise. Therefore the cultivator benefits more in this 
system because in dragon-head enterprises most profits go to the enterprise leaving little 
for the producer. This system would bring together the entire chain of production: 
processing companies, marketing companies and farmers.94 Currently there is no 
substantive government support of these organizations, but small cooperative 
organizations do exist. In the dairy industry, farmer are slowly becoming more popular. 
These cooperatives are very attractive to farmers because it gives the farmer more power 
and authority when negotiating prices for their goods. The goal of these organizations is 
more power and an increasing income for the farmers, which many cooperatives have 
been able to achieve.95 
 Finally, there are many businesses that are similar in size to dragon-head 
enterprises, but instead of relying on small scale farmers for the raw goods, these 
companies have their own farms and control all areas of processing from farm to store. 
This system is more attractive to many companies because with complete control, the 
company can better ensure product quality. This system is slowly becoming more popular 
in the dairy industry as large companies buy large plots of land for their cattle. In the pork 
industry this system is even more popular. There are also many more governmental 
supports for large scale farms such as subsidies and tax breaks that encourage the 
construction of large farms. 
                                                 
94 Ibid., 121. 
95 Jimin Wang & Hongbo Xiao. (2007). Pork Production in China. Institute of Developing 
Economies Japan External Trade Organization. 18. 
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Table 4: Numbers of Vertical Integration Entities by Organization Type, 2000-200596 
 
 In each of these systems, food safety is an extremely important issue, but each of 
these systems alone does not appear to be enough. One solution is the use of technology 
to help track the progress from farm to store. These fragmented systems can make it hard 
to track where contaminated food comes from. The Ministry of Commerce as well as 
outside companies, such as IBM, are working to create systems that would make tracking 
of goods much easier. The Ministry of Commerce’s program allows consumers to see 
where each individual item is from which makes tracking of problems easier and 
therefore increase accountability. IBM is creating food supply management technology, 
which would go to the processor and give companies more information on all of their 
goods. The goal of this technology is to streamline commercial structure and improve the 
safety of all food overall. 
 Companies have also been responding individually to the food safety crisis by 
adjusting their commercial structure. Dragon-head companies that relied entirely on small 
scale farmers are now creating a hybrid system. The companies own their own farm and 
livestock and also utilize the small farmers. Some companies are even using their 
influence to teach local farmers how to best use their land and livestock. These practices 
                                                 
96 Phillip Huang. (2011). China’s new-age farms and their vertical integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops? Modern China, 37(2), 122. 
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help improve food safety and work well with local farmers in order to best utilize 
resources. They also give the companies more control over the product quality and safety 
and increase accountability in the case of more food safety issues. 
 Of the three main structures described above, the dragon-head structure has the 
most flaws, but dominates the commercial structure of agriculture in China. This 
structure is the most popular because it utilizes the existing agricultural structure of 
China, but there are many other options available to large businesses. Since the history of 
food safety issues has been associated with this system, changes need to be made in this 
system to improve food safety and food safety regulation. Most structures have been 
constructed to work with the current agricultural structure in China, which is dominated 
by small farms, but enterprises need to find ways to work with the current structure safely 
and optimize safe food production. Both the dairy and pork industries are dominated by 
dragon-head enterprises and most of their safety issues have arisen from companies with 
this structure. Reports on past, current and potential commercial structures in the dairy 
and pork industries have revealed that there are viable alternatives to the dragon-structure 
system that can help improve and streamline commercial structure. 
 
DAIRY  
 Commercial dairy production is divided into three main systems: dragon-head 
enterprises that rely on small farmers through milking stations, dairy husbandry areas or 
dairy zones supported by either government or large enterprises, and dairy farm 
household cooperatives. The majority of dairy is processed by the dragon-head 
enterprises. The top 5 dairy companies produce 39.26% of all dairy in China (see Table 
5). These companies rely on small farmers for their dairy and build milking stations 
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throughout the area where local farmers go twice a day to milk their cows. 97 From there 
the milk is then sent to the companies. These milking stations are either corporately 
owned by the dragon-head enterprises or are cooperative owned, but frequently the 
people who work at the milking stations are merely middlemen. 98 Therefore the dragon-
head companies do not have complete control over the stations not only because they are 
distanced from the processing centers, but also because they are not well supervised.  
Table 5: Top 5 Dairy Processors99 
 
This was the source of the melamine scandal in 2008. Dairy farmers brought their 
cows into the milking stations to be milked, but because their milk was low in protein, the 
middlemen added melamine to make the protein content appear higher. Protein is 
measured at the milking station and when the raw milk reaches the plant. By adding 
melamine after the farmers had milked and the cows and sold their milk to the 
middleman, the middleman would pay less for the raw milk from the farmer and then 
would sell the raw milk with a “higher” protein content to the processing company for a 
                                                 
97 Hu Dinghuan (2004). China: Dairy product quality as the new industry driver. 
Agricultural Economic Research Institute. 29. 
98 Ibid., 37. 
99 Dobson, W., Dong, F. and E. Jesse. (2011). The Dairy Sector of China: A Country 
Study. (Babcock Institution Discussion Paper). Babcock Institute for International Dairy 
Research and Development, Wisconsin. 18. 
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higher profit. This was done to increase the cost of the milk and therefore increase the 
middlemen’s profit. Inadequate testing at the processing center allowed the milk to reach 
the production stage, but the problem originated from the milking stations (see Figure 3). 
In this instance the middleman was not connected to the main processing company and 
could add the melamine without fear of repercussions. The lack of connection between 
the middlemen and the main processing companies, common throughout most dragon-
head enterprises, allowed this scandal to happen. 
Figure 3: How Melamine was added in the milk supply chain100 
 
 Although there is a history of serious flaws associated with this system, most 
large dairy companies in China still rely on this commercial structure in order to obtain 
their raw product. Both Yili and Mengniu, the top two diary processors in the country, 
rely on the milking stations for their product. Mengniu has more than 3000 production 
bases and contracts with 3 million farmers.101 The companies are working with the 
existing agricultural structure in the way that seems best because it utilizes agricultural 
workers that dominate the industry, small farms. However, given the history of this 
                                                 
100 Shumei Chen. (2009). Shame or sham: Rethinking China’s milk powder scandal from 
legal perspective. Journal of Risk Research, 12(6), 731. 
101 Mengniu Dairy Company. (2009). Introduction. Retrieved from 
http://www.mengniu.com.cn. 
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structure, companies will need to adapt and change this structure to provide more 
accountability for their product quality. 
Another popular method used by large companies is dairy husbandry areas or 
dairy zones. These zones hold 200-300 cows and sometimes 500-1,000 cows.102 Each 
household manages its own cows, but barns and other structures as well as milking and 
disease control are controlled and taken care of by the zone. These zones are often 
supported with funds from the local governments and by large dairy processing 
enterprises. Yili, one of the top dairy companies in China has nearly 200 dairy zones in 
Inner Mongolia. 103 These zones are closer to the cooperative model, but are still 
monitored and organized by large scale dragon-head enterprises. They seem to have 
better standards for safety because the conditions for production are organized and 
controlled by the large companies without completely erasing the farmer’s autonomy. 
Since this structure is organized and controlled by the company supervision of milking 
can be assumed to be better, and product quality can be ensured. 
 The final system is the dairy farm household cooperative. This system is 
relatively new as a law was only passed recently that allowed and encouraged the 
creation of farmers’ cooperatives. 104 In this system farmers produce milk individually, 
but work together to sell to a larger enterprise as a whole. This gives farmers more power 
and authority to negotiate prices. Some local governments are encouraging the 
construction of these cooperatives. Theoretically the cooperatives would improve food 
safety because the farmers would get a fairer price for their goods and therefore care 
                                                 
102 Hu Dinghuan (2004). China: Dairy product quality as the new industry driver. 
Agricultural Economic Research Institute. 38. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 39. 
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more about the quality of milk. It would also eliminate the middle man as farmers would 
be dealing directly with the processing companies, streamlining the process. This is a 
slow growing system in China, but one example is Taipingzhuang Dairy Association in 
Heilongjiang, which has more than 730 members and 4,200 heads of dairy cows.105 
These are the three main systems dominating dairy production in China, but as 
safety becomes a more important issue, some companies have begun to use a 
combination of these three systems. Mengniu for example has relied on milking stations 
for most of its history, but in reaction to the melamine scandal of 2008 has begun to start 
its own farms. Currently Mengniu owns 14 dairy farms with more than 10,000 cows each 
while also using small farms through milking stations.106 The company-owned farms 
were bought and created as a reaction to the melamine safety scandal. By owning their 
own farms, Mengniu hopes to be able to better control dairy product quality. Yili also 
owns its own farms. According to the Yili website,  “Yili is the only dairy product 
producer that possesses three major dairy farms in Tianshan of Xinjiang, Hulunbeier and 
Xilinguole of Inner Mongolia.”107 Bright Dairy, a Chinese company based in Shanghai, 
also owns its own dairy farms. Bright is the third largest dairy processor in the country 
with 10 farms and 12,000 cows, but unlike Yili and Mengniu has never had a large safety 
scandal. This could be attributed to the fact that Bright Dairy owns and controls its own 
farms allowing for greater control of product quality and safety. This mixture of owning 
                                                 
105 Ibid. 
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farms and using rural dairy farmers is becoming more popular as food safety becomes an 
important issue because it allows for more control and therefore can improve safety. 
Foreign companies have seen these challenges to food safety, and have created 
different methods for dealing with China’s agricultural system. Foreign investment in the 
dairy industry is also on the rise so this adjustment is very important (see Table 6). 
Nestle, who has been investing in China for over two decades, has begun to invest even 
more money into the dairy industry after food safety issues with Chinese dairy farms. 
These recent scandals could benefit Nestle since Chinese consumers are buying more 
foreign products, assuming that they are safer. Nestle is now investing $396 million in its 
dairy enterprises in China and hopes to invest even more over the next three years.108 
Using its own hybrid system called the “Milk District” or factory and farmers system 
Nestle can better control product quality and safety. These systems are similar to milking 
stations, but each station is highly control and monitored by Nestle. Rural farmers bring 
their cows to each station and receive technical and medical assistance from Nestle. 
Additionally, Nestle is placing importance on education of farmers and offers free 
training sessions so that farmers can be relied on to have safe milk.109 By having more 
educated farmers who use more modernized methods Nestle hopes to produce the safest 
dairy possible.110 
                                                 
108 Bloomberg News. (2012, January 12). Nestle boosts milk production in China after 
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Table 6: Foreign dairy enterprises divided by region in 2009111 
District 
Number of 
Enterprises (unit) 
Gross Industrial Output 
Value1,000 yuan) 
Percent of Total 
Gross Output 
Percent of Total 
Enterprises 
National Total 111 68,035,998 100 100 
Beijing 5 2,879,962 4.23 4.5 
Tianjin 4 167,154 0.25 3.6 
Hebei 9 4,871,424 7.16 8.1 
Shanxi 3 1,139,885 1.68 2.7 
Inner Mongolia 11 14,518,344 21.34 9.9 
Liaoning 5 2,493,293 3.66 4.5 
Jilin 0 270,639 0.39 0 
Heilongjiang 15 10,594,177 15.57 13.51 
Shanghai 3 7,357,037 10.81 2.7 
Jiangsu 0 335,714 0.49 0 
Zhejiang 0 325,758 0.48 0 
Anhui 0 2,030,584 2.98 0 
Jiangxi 0 60,600 0.08 0 
Shandong 13 4,302,549 6.32 11.71 
Henan 0 108,074 0.15 0 
Hubei 0 831,551 1.22 0 
Hunan 4 2,153,759 3.16 3.6 
Guangdong 12 7,523,125 11.05 10.81 
Hainan 0 25,678 0.03 0 
Sichuan 3 302,646 0.44 2.7 
Guizhou 0 350,706 0.51 0 
Shaanxi 9 5,086,756 7.48 8.1 
Ningxia 0 115,423 0.17 0 
Xinjiang 0 191,160 0.28 0 
 
Another foreign owned dairy farm, Hua Xia, has completely ignored the most 
popular method of dairy production in China, milk stations, and owns its own farms. 
Furthermore it uses California dairy farm style, open air stalls with technologically 
advance milking houses, in order to ensure the health of the cows and the safety of the 
milk. It operates by the motto that happy cows make better milk and aims to provide the 
best environment for cows and farmers alike. Like Nestle, Hua Xia places large 
importance on education of its personnel and farms and has training courses for farming 
                                                 
111 Compiled from China Data Services Statistical Yearbook 
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personnel.112 These methods, along with high technological standards have allowed both 
Nestle and Hua Xia to operate without food safety issues that are felt by other Chinese 
dairy companies. 
 The dragon-head structure that dominates dairy production is not the best method 
of ensuring food safety in the dairy industry. The structure is fragmented and leaves room 
for errors to be made and go unnoticed. For dairy, a hybrid system using the above three 
described structures is the best choice for ensuring dairy safety. Processing companies 
need to improve supervision over all steps in the production process to prevent issues 
such as melamine contamination. A hybrid system would be best both for food safety and 
for the rural farmers that still dominate the agricultural structure in China.  
 
PORK  
 Production of pork is organized in a similar manner to dairy production. Large 
processing companies dominate the industry and the independent small processing is 
shrinking. Compared to dairy production, meat production in China is much more 
industrialized and even better suited to large scale processing. Large processing industries 
include Shuanghui Group in Henan Province, Yurun Group in Jiangsu Province, Jinluo 
Group and Delisi Group in Shandong Province, Kunpeng Group in Beijing, Huazheng 
Group in Jilin Province, and Tieqi Group and Lishi Group in Sichuan Province.113 Most 
of these industrial groups use a similar system of vertical commercial integration, but the 
three main commercial integration structures described above dominate the industry: 
                                                 
112 (2011). Hua Xia Story. Hua Xia. Retrieved from 
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113 Jimin Wang & Hongbo Xiao. (2007). Pork Production in China. Institute of 
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dragon-head farms, processing centers and cooperatives, and company owned farms. 
However, like the dairy industry more processing centers are reacting to food safety 
issues and are trying to improve their system of vertical integration. 
The first and most popular commercial structure is the dragon-head model where 
thousands of small farmers are integrated into large-scale business. Companies provide 
seed, feed, medicine, technology, and marketing while farmers provide the raw 
product.114 Farmers and companies are “linked in order to conduct a version of 
industrialized large-scale production.”115 Farmers that are commercially connected to 
processing companies under this model are often treated poorly and are given unfair 
prices for their goods, but can also renege on their contracts and sell their goods to 
another processing center.116 Furthermore, the most recent pork scandal, the clenbuterol 
scandal, arose from a company that uses this system.  
A subsidiary of Shuanghui Group was found to have been the source of this 
contaminated pork. Shuanghui Group is the largest meat-processing center in the entire 
country slaughtering 15 million heads and producing over 100 million tons of pork 
annually.117 With production centers in over 12 provinces, Shuanghui is both 
transnational and transregional and also exports internationally.118 During the clenbuterol 
scandal in April 2011, it was discovered that the contaminated pork came from 
clenbuterol tainted feed. In most cases feed is provided by the company so this implicates 
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the company. In this instance the farmer is supposed to trust the company and therefore 
the food safety issues cannot be blamed on the farmer, but on the company. However it 
was only found in one of Shuanghui’s subsidiary companies not in the main company 
itself and the source of the clenbuterol is not well known. The use of clenbuterol however 
is known to be common and widespread.  
 The second form of commercial vertical integration is the cooperative association 
plus the large scale enterprises system. This model was first implemented in Qingzhu 
village in an attempt to increase the living standards of the Chinese pork farmers.119 This 
is also a system of large scale production, but with this system, as described above, the 
farmers have more benefits. In its trial run at Qingzhu village the system enhanced the 
quality of the hogs, improved efficiency of the industry, and increased income of the 
farmers.120 Because of the results, this system is viewed as an improvement on the 
dragon-head system of production. A large scale processing business still operates the 
processing side of the system, but because the farmers form an association together, they 
are able to have more benefits and pool their resources, which leads to a higher quality of 
pork. Delisi Company aims to achieve this model in order to optimize production and 
food quality. Another form of cooperative farming is not as popular, but incorporates the 
entire processing system. This system sets up a bridge between small-scale farmers and 
large scale markets. For many farmers the industry has become too large for them to 
handle individually, so they work together to form this commercial system. The largest 
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farmers’ cooperative is in Taiyan city, Shanxi Province. It incorporates more than 32 
hundred-scale farms. 
 The final mode of production is company owned farms. The companies create 
base farms, which they own and then have local rural farmers farm the land. These are 
large-scale farms, owned by companies that also control the processing system. Yurun 
Group uses this mode of production, but like the dairy industry, still utilizes small hog 
farmers.121 Zhongpin Inc on the other hand owns its own farm and controls the entire 
process from farm to store. Based in Henan Province, Zhongpin has processing and 
distribution centers all throughout the country (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Zhongpin Distribution Map122 
 
Unlike dairy processing companies, which are specialized in only dairy, all of 
these companies are agricultural processing companies that process meats, fruits and 
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vegetables. Although most of the meat they process is pork, they also process other 
meats. For some companies this facilitates the creation of markets that sell goods 
processed by these companies. Zhongpin Inc for example has a total of 2,995 retail stores 
where it sells not only its pork products but all other meat products and fruits and 
vegetables as well.123 Zhongpin is viewed as a more modern production system since it 
owns its own farms, processing center and retail stores. This system has allowed 
Zhongpin to pass many inspections and receive high product quality and safety ratings. 
Shuanghui’s Shineway label is also a chain retail supermarket where Shuanghui Group 
sells its agricultural goods. 
The main method of improving food safety in the pork industry is modernization 
of processing centers and technological advances for testing the pork and for tracking the 
pork. IBM is currently working with Shandong Commercial Group Co. to create a system 
that will track their products. This system is intended to ensure the safety of their 
products as they reach coastal regions of the country. Called “food supply management-
technology” this system will go from farm, to slaughterhouses to supermarket shelves 
and will give the company the ability to trace where all of the food originated.124 This 
will be important for accountability and for discovering where food safety issues stem 
from. The company also wants to increase consumer confidence as consumers have been 
bombarded with food safety issues over the past year. 
 Unlike the dairy industry, there is no clear structure that appears to be better for 
improving food safety. The dragon-head structure has experienced the most food safety 
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issues, like in the dairy industry, but it also completely dominates the pork processing 
sector. Some companies do own their own farms, but technological advances, such as 
IBM’s food safety system, seem to be the best method of improving accountability, 
product quality and overall food safety in the industry. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Vertical integration of commerce in the dairy and pork industries needs to be 
improved in order to improve food safety in China. Dairy’s production chain is in the 
midst of reforming, but still has many holes where problems can arise. The pork industry 
on the other hand is fairly well established and is relying on larger, but still distanced 
farms and could benefit greatly from technological advances. It is in the interests of these 
processing companies to have the safest goods possible, because it increases consumer 
confidence, but the government and regulatory agencies are responsible for ensuring that 
these companies follow guidelines. If commercial structure of pork, dairy, and other 
agricultural products can be streamlined in order to form closer connections between 
every production stage, the structure will then be easier to regulate and food safety issues 
will more easily be avoided. Regulation and implementation of food safety laws and 
regulations on these commercial systems now needs to be examined in order to improve 
overall food safety in China. 
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CHAPTER 3: GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The final obstacle on the path to improving food safety in China is regulation and 
implementation of food safety laws. Proper regulation and implementation of food safety 
is a large problem in China because all other elements of food safety rely on good and 
comprehensive regulation and implementation of those regulations. For example, it does 
not matter if an industry has a strong and easy to regulate agricultural structure if the 
regulatory agencies are not good at regulating. Similarly, commercial structure is 
unimportant if regulation and implementation of the industry are subpar. China’s current 
system of regulation is too fragmented, which allows food safety problems to slip through 
the cracks unnoticed. Additionally, implementation at the local level needs to improve in 
order to ensure that the regulations are actually being followed. There are five main 
factors of this problem to discuss: regulatory laws, regulatory agencies, education by 
those agencies, regulatory standards, and local implementation of laws and standards. 
These five elements are extremely important when examining food safety because they 
are the source of most issues in regulation and implementation. Although each factor is 
extremely complex, these weaknesses could be improved by streamlining the regulatory 
system and changing the regulatory focus from reaction to food safety issues to 
prevention of food safety issues. 
Streamlining regulation would fix China’s fragmentation issue. Regulation could 
be streamlined by giving regulatory power to one or two agencies instead of the thirteen 
that are currently involved in food safety, or by creating an entirely new agency that is 
completely responsible for food safety. This would, however, be very difficult, because 
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high levels of bureaucracy and political gridlock would impede the process. Additionally, 
the regulatory agencies can improve local implementing by changing the focus from 
reaction to prevention in order to stop food safety problems before they happen. The laws 
only focus on punishments for violators, not on how to prevent violations from occurring. 
By examining the laws governing regulation, ministries in charge of regulation, the role 
of education in each industry, implementation of those regulations, and reports on local 
implementation, problems in the regulatory structure and implementation will be revealed 
and solutions will be examined. 
 
LAWS REGULATING FOOD SAFETY IN CHINA 
 There are three main laws regulating food safety in China: the Product Quality 
Law of 1993, the Food Hygiene Law of 1995, and the Food and Safety Law of 2009. The 
Product Quality Law of 1993 applies to the General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), giving it the power to issue permits to 
food processors and other food enterprises. The Food Hygiene Law of 1995 was the first 
law intended to focus directly on food safety, but the focus of this law was more on the 
cleanliness of food than the safety of the food.125 According to the law, the safety of food 
is dependent on the cleanliness of the food preparation and processing centers not on 
what is inside the food or what bacteria may have contaminated the food. There is some 
mention of additives, but the chapter entitled “Safety of Food” is only about hygiene and 
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cleanliness of food preparation.126 This law originally gave regulatory power to multiple 
agencies, fragmenting the process. 
The most recent law, the Food and Safety Law of 2009, was an attempt to 
streamline and enforce food safety regulation. It was passed in reaction to the melamine 
scandal of 2008 with hopes that it would prevent another similar scandal, but it did very 
little to improve the fragmentation of the regulatory system. This law changed the 
methods of regulation, the duties of each ministry, and created the State Council Food 
Safety Commission in order to improve the regulation of food safety in China.127 
However, currently the room for ambiguity within the law prevents effective regulation 
and many scholars think that China missed its chance for an effective regulatory system 
by passing the Food and Safety Law without clearly defined regulatory provisions.128 The 
State Council Food Safety Commission, which that focuses on food additives, edible 
farm products, and food processing, theoretically would improve regulation and food 
safety, but the power of this commission is again hindered by the fragmentation of the 
system. Under this law, regulatory power is still spread between many ministries and 
none of the ministries want to relinquish control over their areas of focus or the added 
revenue of regulation, maintaining the system of fragmentation that exists today.129 
Although these measures did not do much to improve the fragmentation of the 
food safety system, the law did improve food safety regulations with several substantive 
measures. The law directly outlines food safety standards, including what can and needs 
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to be regulated, inspection and testing of food, licensing of processing and distribution of 
food, and created harsher penalties for violations of the law. 130 There is a much larger 
focus on the quality and safety of the food including additives, pesticides, and other 
harmful contaminates that make food unsafe for consumption. The law requires stricter 
regulations on food safety and has a true focus on food safety compared to the Food 
Hygiene Law of 1995.131 In Article 6 of the Food Hygiene Law of 1995 it says, “Food 
shall be non-toxic, harmless, and meet the inherent nutrition requirements and present the 
corresponding organoleptic properties, such as color, smell, taste, etc.”132 In the same 
section of the Food Safety Law of 2009 it says, “The food safety standards shall specify: 
The limits to the content or concentration of pathogenic microorganisms, pesticide 
residues, veterinary medicine residue, heavy metals, contaminants, and other substances 
that may be hazardous to human health in food.”133 The regulations placed by the Food 
Safety Law are much more specific and focused on food safety issues. All of these 
regulations are an improvement over the lax regulations and inspection guidelines in the 
past, and have the power to improve food safety. 
 
MINISTRIES IN CHARGE OF REGULATION 
Although the new food safety law improves regulations over food itself, the 
regulatory system is still highly fragmented and too many agencies have overlapping 
jurisdiction (see Table 7). Thirteen different ministries and agencies are responsible for 
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some element of food safety regulation. In contrast, in the United States only two 
agencies are responsible for food safety, the FDA and USDA. China’s fragmented 
system, composed of so many different agencies and ministries, allows for more 
mistakes, weaker regulations, and unclear and overlapping jurisdictions. For example, 
when the power to declare certain foods fit to eat is given to multiple ministries, the 
consumer can be faced with an extremely confusing situation and retailers will not know 
which foods are safe to sell. When cancer-causing chemicals were found to be in 
vermicelli in 2005, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine (GAQSIQ) declared 30 brands of vermicelli fit for consumption, but the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) only listed 7 brands fit for consumption.134 The consumer was 
given the task of deciding which ministry was more trustworthy, and stores were not 
forced to remove certain brands since they were on one of the ministries’ lists.  
Figure 5: Regulatory control over production chain 
 
 
 
 
 
AQSIQ: General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, SAIC: State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, SFDA: State Food and Drug Association 
 
Furthermore, a different regulatory agency has control over each part of the 
production chain. For example, the Ministry of Health will set the national standard for 
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milk, but the AQSIQ will set the regulations for the production and processing of milk. 
Once the product leaves the processing center, then the SAIC regulates the distribution of 
food. Finally, consumption in restaurants and cafeterias is controlled by the State Food 
and Drug Administration. Since each stage of the production chain is controlled by 
different agencies each stage has different regulations. Regulations could be stricter in 
one stage than the other leading to confusing regulations for companies to follow. 
Table 7: Ministires in Charge of Regulation and their Responsibilities135 
Institution Law Responsibilities 
Where in 
processing 
chain 
Ministry of 
Health (MoH) 
China's Food 
Hygiene Law 
1995 
In charge of Supervision and management of food 
hygiene. Authorities: issuing hygiene licenses; 
monitoring, inspecting and providing technical 
guidance for food hygiene; investigating and dealing 
with food poisoning or food contamination incidents, 
and imposing fines or revoking hygiene license.  
Food Safety 
Law 2009 
Assess food safety risk, set national standards of 
food safety, release information relating to food 
safety, regulate food safety testing, investigate food 
safety incidents. (SFDA works under MoH) 
Set national 
standard 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
(MoA) 
Food Safety 
Law 2009 Responsible for non-processed farm products  
Ministry of 
Commerce 
(MoC) 
Food Safety 
Law 2009 
Can enact and amend standards and rules regarding 
the procedures for food processing, packaging, 
storage, transportation, and sales  
General 
Administration 
of Quality 
Supervision, 
Inspection and 
Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) 
The Product 
Quality Law 
1993 
Issues production permits for food processors and 
producers, supervises licensed food enterprises for 
compliance with regulations concerning food 
manufacturing, packaging, and labeling, and is 
empowered to crack down on unlicensed food 
processing and production. Can issue fines, 
confiscate products, and ban food manufacturers 
from continuing production.  
Food Safety 
Law 2009 
Supervision of food production and food 
export/import 
Production and 
processing 
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State 
Administration 
for Industry 
and Commerce 
(SAIC) 
The Product 
Quality Law 
1993 
Issues business license and oversees food hygiene in 
urban and rural markets, empowered to fine and 
revoke business license of violators  
Food Safety 
Law 2009 
Supervise the domestic wholesale and retail food 
sectors 
Food 
distribution 
State Food and 
Drug 
Administration 
(SFDA) Food Safety 
Law 2009 
Authorized to exercise comprehensive supervision 
over safety of food, health products and cosmetics. 
Coordinates relevant bureaucracies, to draft laws, 
and administrative regulations concerning food 
safety. (Has very little actual power) 
Consumption 
(Restaurant, 
Cafeteria, etc.) 
State Council 
Food Safety 
Commission 
Food Safety 
Law 2009 
Co-ordinate and oversee new food supervision 
apparatus  
 
According 2009’s Food Safety Law, the MoH is the main agency in charge of 
food safety and all the other agencies report to the MoH. However, many industries can 
form their own regulations over different parts of the production chain. The MoH sets the 
national standard, but then all other portions of regulation are divided among other 
agencies. The law also created a separate council for food safety, but the duties of this 
council are not clearly defined in the Food Safety Law or in the law’s implementation 
measures. Solving fragmentation is extremely difficult because many of the agencies are 
competitive and refuse to work together. This competitiveness is caused by a large 
amount of political gridlock as different agencies do not want to lose jurisdiction and 
therefore revenue over areas of food safety. This causes agencies to do not share 
information, nor take the blame when there are large food safety issues. Blame is passed 
around without officially blaming any one agency or individual, and eventually falls on a 
scapegoat who did not play a large role in the issue.136  
Furthermore, all of these ministries want to maintain the current balance because 
regulation of food safety increases their revenue and power. For example, when the 
AQSIQ issues permits it receives an increase in revenue; production and processing 
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centers pay for each permit they receive. If regulatory power was consolidated, the 
AQSIQ could lose this area of control and lose revenue. This is the same situation for all 
ministries that have a role in food safety regulation. Additionally, because all of the 
ministries do not want to lose areas of control, there is internal political struggle that 
prevents changes to the current regulatory structure. All of the ministries want to 
maintain their political power, which prevents anything from getting done. This law 
attempted to fix previous problems, but, as seen in Table 7, the problems remain. Food 
safety problems will continue to occur until the problem is resolved. 
 
EDUCATION  
 Another area where the regulatory system needs to improve is in education of 
farmers, processors, and retailers. Many food safety issues occur because of ignorance of 
farmers. As a result of a growth and change in production, production methods have 
changed drastically. The methods that farmers use are not always safe, but most are 
uneducated and do not know what safe farming practices are.  For example, when farmers 
are given feed that is supposed to make their livestock grow faster and leaner, they do not 
question why. Additionally, there has been an increase in the use of drugs to keep 
animals alive, or stimulate and enhance their growth. Antibiotics are used to combat or 
prevent diseases, and stimulants such as clenbuterol are used to add meat to the body of a 
pig, enhancing the leanness of the meat, without thought being given to how these drugs 
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will affect the humans who consume the meat.137 Farmers do these things in order to be 
competitive with other farmers; they do not know the repercussions.  
Farmers need to be better educated in order to ensure the safety of their food. 
According to the Food Safety Law, “civil society and community groups are encouraged 
to conduct food safety educational activities on understanding food safety, laws, 
regulations, and standards, to advocate healthy diets and to raise consumer awareness of 
food safety and looking after their health.”138 This however does not require that anyone 
educates the public about food safety and does not mandate a specific agency to be 
responsible for food safety. 
 In 2011 the government began a year-long campaign to promote food safety and 
raise awareness of food safety. It has become a top priority for the Chinese government 
and the media is now widely reporting these issues.139 This is supported by the Food 
Safety Law, which states that “food safety information, laws, regulations and standards 
shall be publicized by the media.”140 The Chinese government and media are taking on 
the role of educating the public, but one of the ministries should also be involved. In the 
United States, for example, the USDA is responsible for educating the public about issues 
ranging from what items have been recalled to how to properly handle and prepare raw 
meat.141 There is an entire section of the website devoted to teaching the consumer. China 
should follow this example and try to prevent food safety issues not only react to them. 
                                                 
137 Peter Li. (2009). Exponential Growth, Animal Welfare, Environmental and Food 
Safety Impact: The Case of China’s Livestock Production. Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, 22, 228. 
138 (2009). The PRC Food Safety Law, Article 7. 2. 
139 Lin Liu. (2011, August). China seeks to address food safety crisis. Washington Post. 
140 (2009). The PRC Food Safety Law, Article 7. 2. 
141 (2012) FoodSafety.gov. USDA. Retrieved from www.foodsafety.gov. 
 65
 
STANDARDS 
 
The final issue in regulation of food safety is the lax regulations or near lack of 
regulation that was common in the early 2000s. In the melamine scandal of 2008, 
melamine went undetected for almost an entire year because large dairy companies were 
not regularly tested; large well-known companies were given exemption from testing.142 
Melamine was deliberately added to the milk and the company knew of the 
contamination, but because large companies were exempt from regular testing, this 
information did not become public until after the deaths of many children. According to 
Article 18 of the Food Hygiene Law, enterprises were allowed to regulate themselves: 
“Enterprises engaged in food production, management and sale shall perfect their own 
food safety control system, assign full-time or part-time food safety control personnel, 
and strengthen laboratory testing work related to the foods they produce and sell.”143 
There were given inspection free status.144 People were severely punished for their part in 
the scandal, but the damage was done. Lax regulations, or near lack of regulations, 
combined with a fragmented regulatory system, allowed this scandal to happen. 
Although there have been reforms to regulations, the dairy industry still faces 
much controversy over specific standards. For example, bacterium content regulations are 
controversial because the limit for China’s dairy is much less stringent than the 
international limit. The limit in China is 2 million units per milliliter, while 
internationally it is 100,000 units per milliliter. It is an improvement on past standards of 
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4 million units per milliliter.145 Additionally the AQSIQ lowered minimum protein level 
in dairy from 2.95% to 2.8% in order to decrease the incentives of adding melamine to 
milk, but officials have faced some complaints from that change.146 The AQSIQ also 
imposes regulations that many companies do not have the funds to achieve. In early 2011, 
AQSIQ instituted new regulations for dairy requiring processing companies to test for 64 
additives, including melamine. The equipment needed for these tests will cost companies 
at least 3 million yuan (US $456,000).147 By some estimates, only companies with annual 
revenues exceeding 80 million yuan will be able to afford this upgrade.148 Because of the 
financial restrictions of many companies, many firms fail inspections. In early April 
2011, AQSIQ reported that 643 firms passed inspection, while 426 failed and 107 were in 
suspension.149 
Standards set by the regulatory agencies are becoming stricter; however, many 
still complain that these standards are not enough. Calls for more stringent regulations, 
especially in the dairy industry, are frequent. Furthermore, many food safety issues occur 
because not all companies can afford to test their products to see if they meet the 
regulations. Companies need to implement their own inspection measures in order to 
prevent future food safety issues, but currently the local branches of regulatory agencies 
are not good at implementing laws and ensuring that companies follow the standards put 
in place by the central regulatory agencies. 
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IMPLEMENTATION 
 Implementation at the local level is the largest problem facing regulations, 
because the laws and standards that the central regulatory agencies pass are useless unless 
there is effective implementation of the regulations. According to an official, local 
“officials generally exhibit a lackluster response to food safety matters… they will only 
take it seriously if it’s linked to their positions or performance.”150 Frequently, local 
governments and regulatory offices do not follow the regulations because it is profitable 
for them to ignore food safety problems. Revenue generation is often more important 
than food safety regulations, which can limit local growth.151  Local food safety offices 
have been set up around the country in recent years, but they dodge responsibility and 
blame other departments where there are food safety issues.152 However, licenses are 
enthusiastically issued by these departments because they bring in money.153 The local 
offices are useless unless there is some guarantee that the officers will benefit from good 
performance. Currently the local offices are ineffective because they are more focused on 
their careers than on their performance. Local officials also often overlook violations 
when personal bribes are offered, and, in order to create more revenue for the region, 
local regulatory agencies will frequently fine businesses instead of halting their practices 
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when a violation is discovered.154 According to a dairy farmer from Shijiazhuang, “In this 
business, bribery keeps everyone silent.”155 
The government does not stress the importance of implementation and focuses 
instead on reacting to food safety issues. Therefore, harsh punishments such as the death 
penalty are being used in an attempt to prevent violations of food safety regulations. The 
regulatory agencies seem to think that the best method of improving implementation is to 
increase the levels of punishment, but preventative methods would avoid the problem 
altogether. China’s regulatory agencies need to focus on ways to prevent food safety 
scandals, not only how to respond to food safety scandals, in order to improve food 
safety. 
 Implementation in the dairy industry is a very serious problem, as the industry has 
been fraught with food safety scandals in the past. In 2008, in reaction to the melamine 
scandal, a total of 21 people were charged with crimes. 156 Two men were executed for 
their part in the scandal. Zhang Yujun, a cattle farmer, was executed for endangering 
public safety, and Geng Jinpin, a salesman, was executed for producing and selling toxic 
food.157 Many people think that these two men were scapegoats and that most of the 
blame should have fallen on Tian Wenhua, Sanlu’s general manager, who received a life 
sentence. 158 Other Sanlu executives were sentenced to between 5 and 15 years in jail.159 
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Four officials in the city were fired: the vice mayor in charge of agricultural production, 
the Shijiazhuang Municipal Animal Husbandry and Fishery Bureau director, 
Shijiazhuang Municipal Food and Drug Administration director, Shijiazhuang Municipal 
Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision director. The mayor of Shijiazhaung also 
resigned.160 Chief of AQSIQ, Li Changjiang was the most senior official to resign and the 
Communist Party chief in Shijiazhuang was fired.161 
 Although many people were punished as a result of this scandal, others feel that 
the wrong people were punished. Zhang Yujun and Geng Jinpin were merely a cattle 
farmer and a salesman, respectively. Their actions were illegal and they deserved to be 
punished, but the actions of Sanlu’s general manager, Tian Wenhua, were much worse. 
Tian knew milk was tainted in May, but did not inform officials in Shijiazhuang city until 
August. There are some reports that the company knew as early as December of 2007, 
but waited to cover it up until there were more complaints. After Sanlu told the city 
officials, the city officials waited a month, from August 2 to September 9, before telling 
the provincial officials because of the Olympics.162 It is reported that the officials were 
pushed to prevent this issue from becoming common knowledge until after the Olympics, 
which were important for international status and national harmony. 
 A year after the melamine scandal, melamine was found again in dairy products 
because tainted milk powder from 2008 had not been destroyed. This second scandal 
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occurred because regulations were not enforced; companies were told to destroy the milk 
powder, but many did not.163 The companies did not understand how to destroy the milk 
powder, but the government did not help them or enforce the rule. Instead, stockpiles of 
contaminated milk powder remained and were added to raw milk to increase the apparent 
protein content. Milk companies were supposed to be testing for melamine, but two years 
later it was still found in products because processing centers are not properly inspected 
and implementation of regulations is poor. 
 Later, in 2011, there was another milk safety scandal. Mengniu, one of the largest 
and most trusted dairy processing companies, was found to have dairy products 
contaminated with a liver-damaging carcinogen. Companies are required to test for this 
carcinogen, but because the testing equipment costs 4,000 to 6,000 yuan, many do not 
test for it. Companies need to improve inspection of their own products.164 Again, the 
focus for this scandal was on punishing those who violated the laws after the fact. 14 
people were sentenced for producing or selling tainted milk. Two people received life 
sentences, four received 10 to 15 years, and the others all received lighter sentences. In 
addition to jail time, fines ranged from 200,000 yuan to 400,000 yuan. 165 
In the pork industry, the reaction to food safety violations has been the same and 
there are few reports on preventative actions taken by local or central regulatory agencies. 
For the Shuanghui clenbuterol scandal in April 2011,  “at least six officials and 
employees at lower-level animal inspection stations have been fired or suspended, while 
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22 others—pig farm managers, traders and slaughterhouse staff—have been detained.”166 
Five people were convicted of “endangering public security by using dangerous means,” 
for their role in feeding clenbuterol to pigs. Sentences ranged from 9 years to life with 
one person receiving the death penalty. These sentences were so extreme because all the 
defendants were aware of the contamination, but did nothing about it. By the end of the 
scandal, in total, 113 people in total were penalized for their role in the scandal, including 
17 government officials. 167 The 17 government officials involved, which included animal 
health and food safety inspectors, got 3 to 9 years imprisonment.168 One man received the 
death penalty for illegal clandestine production of clenbuerol.  
Again, this reaction focused on the punishment of those involved, not ways to 
prevent people from committing this same offense in the future. Currently the Chinese 
government is focusing too much on reacting to food safety violations and not enough on 
how to prevent food safety scandals. Punishments for violations are clearly outlined in 
the new Food Safety Law that range from small fines to the death penalty. The 
government needs to work towards improving local implementation of these laws by 
working to decrease corruption and changing methods of evaluation to promote 
implementation of all food safety regulations. They also need to put a larger burden on 
the companies to self-regulate and change the way they review the work of the local 
officials. Reviews of local officials given the task of regulating food safety should be 
based on the number of farms, manufacturers, and processors that pass food safety 
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inspections. For example, fining individuals or companies should not be rewarded unless 
the fine resulted in an actual change in the actions of that individual or company. 
Evaluations should also look to discourage bribery and corruption, a problem throughout 
the entire Chinese government. 
 
UNITED STATES REGULATION STRUCTURE 
 One model that China could look to in improving its regulatory system is the 
United States. This model would be suitable because the United States is similar in size to 
China and is also an agricultural giant. Furthermore , although the United States relies on 
large-scale farms, it has many more small-scale farms that it also needs to regulate. China 
could follow their model of regulation on its small and large-scale farms in order to 
improve the regulatory system. In the United States, all food safety regulations are 
controlled by two agencies, the FDA and the USDA. The FDA controls almost all 
agricultural products except meat and poultry products. This is due to an historical 
division of power, not different concerns for safety. The FDA originates from a branch of 
the USDA that was given control over all agricultural goods except for meat and poultry. 
This job eventually became too big to be under the USDA and now the FDA is its own 
Administration under the Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore food 
safety jurisdiction is divided. Having only two agencies responsible for regulation with 
clear division of jurisdiction allows for laws and regulations to be uniform and easier to 
follow since there are not many regulatory agencies acting on the same item in different 
ways. 169 
                                                 
169 (2011, Sep. 6). Food Safety is Still a Critical Issue in China. China Daily. 
 73
The FDA has a special food safety office, The Center for Food Safety and 
Applied Nutrition, which issues regulations, recalls food products, and conducts 
inspections. The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 established the legal 
framework within which FDA operates. The most recent food safety law was passed in 
January 2011, the Food Safety Modernization Act which is much more proactive and 
focuses on preventative control, not on reaction to food safety products. This law gives 
the FDA more power to recall food products, calls for more frequent inspections, and 
places more responsibility on farmers and food processors to prevent contamination. 
Additionally, the FDA sets national standards and works with state inspectors and 
bureaus in order to ensure the safety of food products in the United States. 
The USDA also has its own food safety branch, the Food Safety and Inspection 
Service.170 The FSIS is “responsible for ensuring that the nation's commercial supply of 
meat, poultry, and egg products is safe, wholesome, and correctly labeled and 
packaged.”171 The FSIS educates consumers on food safety handling, even using a mobile 
application to teach consumers about proper preparation and handling of food. There are 
many laws regulating each specific industry, which the USDA regulates, clearly outlining 
regulations of food and the USDA’s power.172 Like the FDA, the USDA is prevention-
oriented and performs frequent inspections in coordination with private and state 
inspection services to see if farms and processing companies are following regulations. 
Although the United States’ regulatory system it is not perfect, it is much more 
streamlined than China’s system, with only two agencies involved in regulation and 
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safety control. China has adopted much of the technology used in the United States to 
monitor food safety, but it must take a step further and improve its regulatory and 
implementation systems as well. The USDA and FDA work hard to coordinate with local 
government branches and independent inspectors to inspect facilities and ensure food 
safety. If China were to look to the American model of food safety regulation for 
inspiration and guidance, it could avoid the current confusing regulations and create a 
cohesive system that has complete control over food safety, ensuring that the food on 
people’s tables is safe to eat. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The fragmentation of the regulatory system in China is responsible for most food 
safety problems in China. If there were proper regulations, education, and a streamlined 
regulatory structure, then there would be many fewer food safety issues. China bases its 
agricultural goals on the structure of the United States, but it would do better to base its 
regulatory structure on the structure of the United States as well. Creating one agency 
that is responsible for food safety or giving the power to one or two existing agencies 
would make regulations more effective and would improve overall food safety in China. 
This is true across all industries and would optimize food safety. However, regulation 
alone is not enough if there is not proper implementation of food safety regulations and 
laws. Methods of implementation need to improve and regulatory agencies need to put a 
greater stress on preventing food safety issues instead of merely reacting to them. By 
streamlining the regulatory system and improving implementation of food safety, China 
will be able to avoid many food safety issues in the future. 
 
 75
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCULSION 
 Raising the standard of food safety in China is a complex and important issue. 
Without effective food safety regulation, China has experienced terrible tragedies that 
have resulted not only in illness, but also in death. The melamine scandal of 2008 was the 
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worst food safety issue that China has recently faced with six infant deaths and 300,000 
ill infants. This event caused incredible backlash in China and people are still worried 
and complaining today about the quality of milk. More recent food safety scandals have 
not resulted in death, but illnesses have broken out throughout China as a result of food 
safety issues and the Chinese people do not trust that their food is safe. All of these issues 
make the improvement of food safety regulation very important for future Chinese health, 
society, and economy. 
As described in the introduction, four main issues are proposed by scholars as 
possible causes of the current food safety issues in China; dispersed agricultural structure, 
broken commercial structure, fragmented regulatory system, and poor implementation. 
Of these four main issues, three issues strongly affect regulation: broken commercial 
structure, fragmented regulatory system, and poor implementation. These three issues are 
currently the largest obstacles facing food safety regulation in China because they impede 
the regulatory process. Commercial structure impedes the process because it leaves room 
for errors, the fragmented regulatory structure prevents effective regulation, and poor 
implementation allows errors to slip through the cracks unnoticed. In order to improve 
food safety and strengthen trust in the food industry China needs to streamline the 
commercial system, create a new regulatory agency or give regulatory power to only two 
or three ministries, and change how local officials implement policy. 
 
Although restructuring agriculture in order to improve food safety is a highly 
popular idea among scholars in China, the highly dispersed structure that characterizes 
Chinese agriculture is not responsible for food safety issues in China. It does make 
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regulation of each individual farm difficult, but because all farms are commercially 
vertically integrated with larger processing companies, the small farms, when joined with 
the large farms, form a larger scale production structure. This is supported by reports of 
agriculture in both the dairy and pork industries. Most dairy farms in China are very 
small, but each farm is connected commercially to a larger processing company. 
Furthermore, dairy production is concentrated in northern China, not widely dispersed 
across the country like some scholars claim. Production of pork on the hand is 
widespread and also still based on smaller scale farms. However, like dairy, pork 
production is connected commercially to larger processing centers creating a larger scale 
production structure. 
Although the dairy and pork industries have different geographic and agricultural 
structures, the commercial and economic structures are very similar and follow this 
commercially integrated structure. Both of these industries rely on the small farms that 
scholars criticize, but these farms rely on the large scale businesses. In the dairy industry, 
small farmers rely on milking stations built and owned by companies such as Mengniu 
and Yili. That milk is later sent to these companies for processing. In the pork industry 
feed, medicine and technology are provided by the company that will eventually buy, 
slaughter, and process the pig. This structure acts very similar to the proposed 
transformation of the agricultural system. Restructuring agricultural structure to follow 
the large scale American-style farm is unnecessary and would cause too much strife in 
the Chinese countryside. Also, because the farms are commercial integrated, it appears 
that the structure of farming is not at fault and commercial interests need to be more 
closely examined. 
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Given this information, vertical integration of commerce in the dairy and pork 
industries needs to be improved in order to improve food safety in China. Currently the 
production chain is very fragmented with too many steps and too much room for errors. 
In most industries the path from farm to processing center involves too many middlemen 
creating multiple areas for problems and mistakes. This is related to the widespread 
agricultural structure that characterizes China’s agriculture. Because of this structure, 
large companies have to rely on small farms for their raw goods. This system creates a 
commercial structure with many stages creating more work for regulatory agencies and 
leaving a lot of room for mistakes and mishaps. Dairy’s production chain is in the midst 
of reforming, but still has many holes where problems can arise. The pork industry on the 
other hand is fairly well established and is relying on larger, but still distanced farms, and 
could benefit greatly from technological advances. Both the melamine scandal of 2008 
and the more recent clenbuterol scandal of 2011 occurred because of gaps in commercial 
regulation, testing and commercial structure; melamine would not have been added to the 
milk if the middleman collecting the milk had a stronger connection to the processing 
company. 
Therefore, the commercial structure of pork, dairy and other agricultural products 
should be streamlined in order to form closer connections between every production 
stage. The structure will then be easier to regulate and food safety issues will more easily 
be avoided. Technological solutions have been offered both by the Chinese government 
and by companies such as IBM to help both the consumer and processor track where their 
meat and produce are coming from. The IBM project would help the Shandong Group 
track their pork products far down the production chain all the way to the farm where the 
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pig originated. This will not only increase consumer trust, but also make targeting the 
source of food safety issues much easier and therefore easier to deal with and fix. The 
goal is that increased accountability and control will lead to safer food products. It is in 
the interests of these processing companies to have the safest goods possible in order to 
increase profits and consumer confidence, but part of the burden of safety also lies on 
governmental regulatory agencies that are responsible for ensuring that these companies 
follow guidelines. 
Problems in the regulatory system in China are extremely important because all 
other elements of food safety rely on proper regulation and implementation. The 
fragmentation of the system is responsible for most food safety problems in China. 
Currently there are 13 ministries in charge of food safety in China, that each control 
different portions of the food production and processing chain. This fragmentation allows 
for the same product to have different safety regulations at different stages; even entire 
items could be deemed safe by one ministry and not by another and therefore the 
safe/unsafe item would still be consumed. This system also leads to poor implementation 
of the regulations and laws because the system is very unclear. New laws have been 
passed that attempt to streamline regulations and improve implementation, but the 
problems still remain. 
This fragmentation is hard to fix because of political gridlock in Chinese 
bureaucracy. None of the regulatory agencies want to give up control of their section of 
food safety because regulation of food safety means an increase in revenue and an 
increase in political power. If a new agency was created, many existing agencies would 
lose that power and revenue; therefore it is very hard to streamline regulation. The 
 80
multiple agencies combined with political gridlock also leads to poor communication 
between ministries and therefore more food safety issues can slip through the cracks 
unnoticed. The ideal solution to this problem would be to create a new agency or give 
regulatory power only to two or three existing agencies, but given the political gridlock, a 
more practical solution would be to slowly streamline regulation and attempt to increase 
communication between agencies. 
The most feasible method of improving food safety regulation is to improve 
implementation of food safety regulations and laws. Currently implementation of food 
safety regulations is focused on punishments of violators. After the melamine scandal 
two men were put to death and one woman received life in prison, and punishments have 
continued to get harsher. There was an investigation on how melamine entered the system 
and melamine was outlawed as an additive, but methods of future implementation of 
these laws were not investigated. Many scholars claim that the punishments signal an 
improvement in implementation, but it really just marks a poor regulatory system because 
problems are not being caught before the products reach the shelves. Today, local food 
safety offices do not benefit from closing down factories if they violate food safety 
regulations so many food safety issues go ignored. Revenue only increases from issuance 
of licenses to produce; officials are not rewarded for proper implementation. Therefore 
officials do not properly regulate and most food safety regulations are ignored. 
In order to improve regulation and implementation China needs to change how it 
evaluates regulatory officials to put a greater stress on preventing food safety scandals 
instead of reacting to them. Evaluation of Chinese officials needs to focus on proper 
implementation of laws and officials should be rewarded for good work, not just for 
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increasing revenue.  Evaluations should also look to discourage bribery and corruption, 
although it is a problem throughout the Chinese government. The government also needs 
to encourage processing companies to increase self-inspections and enforce laws that 
require companies to test their own products. This will prevent food that is contaminated 
or toxic from leaving the processing center and it will never be consumed. Greater focus 
on prevention instead of on reaction will greatly improve food safety throughout all 
industries in China. 
 In order to improve food safety and prevent scandals that have plagued China in 
the past, China needs to work to streamline its commercial structure of agriculture, 
streamline its regulatory structure and improve implementation of food safety regulations 
and laws. Although scholars place importance on the structure of agriculture as well, for 
the dairy and pork industries the structure of agriculture cannot be adapted to benefit food 
safety. Agricultural reform would do more harm than good. In the commercial sector, 
companies need to work to better integrate production with processing in order to prevent 
gaps in the production chain. Creating a more cohesive system would allow for more 
control and accountability decreasing the risk of food safety issues. Regulatory agencies 
on the other hand need to improve and streamline regulatory structure and place greater 
emphasis on prevention of issues instead of reaction to food safety scandals. Finally 
implementation of regulations by local officials needs to be improved by changing 
methods of evaluating officials in order to encourage proper inspection and 
implementation. 
Food safety is a critical and complex issue in China that needs to be closely 
examined. Most food safety issues occur because of governmental faults and mistakes 
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made by enterprises. For most industries improving food quality is imperative because 
lack of consumer confidence will result in decreased revenue. Therefore, although the 
government has many problems that need to be fixed in order to improve food safety, 
most food safety improvements will most likely be made by commercial interests. 
Governmental gridlock is too strong and complicated for significant regulatory changes 
and local corruption is too pervasive to improve. It is in the interest of commercial 
enterprises however to become self-regulating and engage in self-inspections because 
better quality food means more consumer confidence and then an increase in revenue. 
Therefore, although the largest flaws are governmental regulatory structure and 
implementation, the most practical method of improving food safety will need to be 
pursued by commercial enterprises. 
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